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Abstract
We study career concerns in Italian academia. We mould our empirical analysis
on the standard model of contests, formalised in the multi-unit all-pay auction. The
number of posts, the number of applicants, and the relative importance of the cri-
teria for promotion determine academics’ effort and output. In Italian universities
incentives operate only through promotion, and all appointment panels are drawn
from strictly separated and relatively narrow scientific sectors: thus the parameters
affecting payoffs can be measured quite precisely, and we take the model to a newly
constructed dataset which collects the journal publications of all Italian university
professors. Our identification strategy is based on a reform introduced in 1999,
parts of which affected different academics differently. We find that individual
researchers respond to incentives in the manner described by the theoretical model:
roughly, more capable researchers respond to increases in the importance of the
publications for promotion and in the competitiveness of the scientific sector by
exerting more effort; less able researchers are discouraged by competition and do
the opposite.
JEL Numbers: D44, I23, I21, M51
Keywords: Career concerns, Applied auction theory, Publications, Academic job
market.
1 Introduction
Like other economic agents, academics operate under incentives: understanding how
they respond to them, beside its independent interest, is indispensable background to
any attempt to improve the behaviour and performance of the university sector. In this
paper we show how the incentive provided by career concerns influenced the effort
and the output of the academics working in Italian universities in the years between
1990 and 2011.
During this period, the Italian university sector followed a complex system of
nationally mandated rules, designed to narrow the scope for cronyism by increasing
transparency and minimising the room for discretion. While following the principle
common to other university sectors that advancement decisions be based on peers’
subjective judgement of a candidate’s quality, these detailed rules distanced Italian
academia from the standard theoretical framework of the academic labour market (e.g.
Carmichael 1988, or Siow 1998). For example, appointment, tenure, and promotion
decisions were minutely regulated, pay was fully determined by rank and seniority,
teaching duties were uniform, there was no review of performance, promotions de-
termined only a small non-negotiable pay rise, horizontal moves could not raise pay,
dismissals for low productivity were non-existent in practice. The combined effect of
these rules is to make the incentive scheme on the whole rather weak (Perotti 2008). But
at the same time, the very meticulousness of the rules and their uniform scrupulous
application across universities and subject areas ensure that academic conditions in
Italy can be captured accurately and consistently, modelled formally, and measured
empirically in a precise manner.
We model academic careers as contests in an uncertain environment, along the lines
of Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) model of progression in an organisation’s hierarchy. The
set of rules regulating the careers of Italian academics can be captured formally as an
all-pay auction for multiple units (Barut et al 2002). In this model, bidders compete
to be awarded one of K identical prizes, with all bidders, winners and losers alike,
paying their bid, and the highest K bidders receiving one of the K prizes. Siegel’s
(2009) comprehensive review notes that the cost incurred by the participants can be
monetary, as is the case for the expenditure on R&D where the prize is the award of a
patent (Grossman and Shapiro 1986), or it can be a utility cost, given by the exertion
of effort, as in Baye et al’s (1993) and Anderson et al’s (1998) models of lobbying and
rent-seeking respectively. In the Italian academia, effort is exerted to carry out research,
and the prizes are the promotions to positions in the next rung of the academic ladder,
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which are fixed in number.
The auction model at the basis of our analysis hinges on competitors knowing the
relevant parameters affecting the competitive conditions: these are (i) the number of
available posts, (ii) the number of potential competitors, (iii) the relative importance
attributed by the appointment panel to the quality and quantity of the publications
and to other academic activities, (iv) and the distribution of their competitors’ char-
acteristics. Because of the narrow channelling of the academic careers into a large
numbers of separated paths, and of the very long temporal gap between appointment
rounds recorded in practice (about four years), it is very plausible to assume that the
professors in a given rank in a given scientific discipline were able to form a fairly
precise measure of these parameters. The theoretical model of Section 2, therefore,
assumes that academics choose their effort, which maps monotonically and deter-
ministically into their output, on the basis of this information. It predicts that differ-
ent individuals respond differently to changes in the competitive conditions: broadly
speaking, more productive academics are encouraged by competition, less productive
ones are discouraged. These conclusions are confirmed by our empirical analysis,
which uses a newly constructed large dataset, that matches administrative data on all
the individuals who have held a post in an Italian university at any time between 1990
and 2011, with all the articles they have authored in that period in journals listed in
the Web of Knowledge dataset. Because there are three levels in academic hierarchy,
we can run two separate regressions, one studying the assistant professors competing
to become associate professors and the other the associate professors competing to
become full professors. These obtain similar results, which moreover are robust to
changes in the definitions the variables and in the specification of the model.
The analysis is conducted via a panel estimation with fixed effects for individual
academics: because the competitive conditions – the importance of publications, the
number of posts, the number of competitors, and an academic’s position in the ranking
of the people competing for these posts – change from period to period, we estimate the
effort exerted by an academic relative to the effort of that same academic in different
competitive conditions. The fixed effects estimation factors out the influence of the
“type” posited in the theoretical analysis, which accounts for attitudes, skill, education
and other idiosyncratic determinants of effort. One would expect these to remain
relative constant across a person’s lifetime, and, encouragingly, we find strong serial
correlation in an academic’s individual fixed effects (see the discussion Figure 10, at
the end of Section 7). This is a confirmation of the soundness of our empirical strategy
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to assess the theoretical model.
Our identification strategy hinges on one important detail of the reform of appoint-
ments and promotions rules which came into force in 1999, right in the middle of the
period we study, namely a cap on the number of applications a candidate could make in
each year. This cap , as we show in Proposition 2, alters two of the parameters affecting
the competitive conditions, the number of posts and the number of competitors, for
some academics, but not for others, in a way that is likely unrelated to other unob-
servable characteristics determining their effort. Moreover, while the decentralisation
of the appointment process could have been predicted in advance, and hence could
have affected a person’s early life choice of the narrow research area, the cap on the
number of applications was unexpected, intended to reduce to workload of the panels.
It was also blunt, it imposed a cap of five publications per year, and has therefore some
of the features of a natural experiment. We show that this aspect of the reform does
indeed affect academics in exactly the manner predicted by the theoretical model. In
addition, we implement an instrumental variable strategy where the other relevant
characteristic of the competitive environment, the importance of refereed publications,
is linked to the homogeneity of the group of the full professors in the narrowly defined
research area where competition takes place, who are the decision makers for these
appointments. A small group of professors with similar records is more likely to agree
on subjective criteria as a determinant of promotion, but it seems unlikely that their
homogeneity should affect directly the individual effort of the associate and assistant
professors competing for promotion.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 applies the standard all-pay multi-unit
auction to the study of academics’ career concerns. Our data is described in Section 3,
with the details of how we construct the variables in Section 4. The empirical strategy
and its econometric specification are explained in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section
7 presents our empirical results, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical background
A simple extension of the multi-unit all-pay auction model developed by Barut et al
(2002) serves well as a stylised model of competition and academic career progression
in Italian universities. This is developed fully in Checchi et al (2014), and here we
summarise the results relevant to the present analysis.
As we explain below, the Italian academic sector can be quite accurately described
as a set of separate populations of academics. The N academics in the representative
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population all work in the same research area, and compete for promotion to the next
rung of their career ladder by exerting costly effort to produce output. In a subsequent
stage, K professorships across all the universities in Italy are advertised simultaneously,
and the N candidates, labelled i = 1, . . . , N, apply for the posts; they are then assessed
by a centrally nominated panel, who appoints simultaneously all the new post holders
(see Section 3 below and Appendix B for the details of the process). They incur their
effort cost whether or not they are successful, hence our choice of the all-pay auction.
Compared to the set-up of an auction, there are two additional sources of un-
certainty on the road from effort to promotion. First, academics exert effort well in
advance of the opening of the relevant vacancies, and so, when they choose effort,
they do not know for certain the criteria which will determine their likelihood of being
appointed. A second layer of uncertainty is the stochastic nature of the link between
effort and output: whether a given article is accepted in that prestigious journal, is, as
we all know, partly due to luck. Checchi et al (2014) assume risk neutrality throughout,
and simplify the model to a static deterministic set-up, where effort translates instantly
and deterministically into output.1
Research output depends on effort. Candidates differ in their cost of effort: the
model assumes that, prior to their choice of effort, each academic is assigned by nature
a idiosyncratic parameter, her “type”, vi ∈ [v, 1], with v ∈ (0, 1), randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution F : [v, 1] → [0, 1], the same for all candidates. vi may
include innate ability, and variables determined before the beginning of the academic
career, such as the place or field of study. It seems natural to assume that, within
the research area, the draws for different individuals are not correlated, which makes
their interaction a private value auction. The parameter v is private information, and
therefore it is conveniently captured by the individual fixed effect in the empirical
analysis.
If candidate i exerts effort bi ∈ B ⊆ R+, then she incurs a utility cost given by bi/vi.
Being inversely related to the utility cost of effort, vi is therefore a measure of individual
i’s efficiency in research, and we also refer to it as an individual’s productivity. The
benefit of being promoted is normalised to 1, and we assume that candidate i chooses
b to maximise the difference between the expected benefit and the cost of effort. A
1They derive this from a dynamic model where risk-neutral academics have rational expectations
about the future values of the relevant variables and the nature of the link between current effort and
future output. With rational expectations, candidates are able, on average, correctly to anticipate the
relevant characteristics of the competitions they will enter, and so evaluate the expected benefits of
effort; with risk-neutrality expected and future benefits determine incentives and can be left implicit in
the presentation.
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strategy for candidate i is thus a function B : [v, 1]→ B, which associates the type vi to
the effort level exerted.
Effort may be directed towards a variety of academic activities, only one of which
is publications in international refereed journals. A person’s chance of promotion may
depend also on more subjectively assessed activities, such as teaching, the influence of
books published, administration, and perhaps also seeking out influential friends and
networks, as it might cross the readers’ mind who are familiar with Italian academia.
The relative importance of international publications and these other activities, de-
noted by x ∈ [0, 1], may vary from research area to research area. In general terms, it
depends on the preferences and the relative clout of the members of the cohort of senior
professors in the various research areas, among whom the panel will be chosen.2 The
competitive conditions faced by those vying for promotion also affect their behaviour.
We capture them with the parameters K and N, defined above as the number of posts
and the number of candidates.
The analysis in Checchi et al (2014) can be summarised in the following result.
Proposition 1. The optimal strategy for candidate of type i is to exert effort level given by:
B (vi) = x
∫ vi
v
yZ′KN (y) dy, (1)
where
ZKN (b) =
N−1
∑
j=N−K
(N − 1)!
(N − j− 1)!j! F
(
V (b)
)j(1− F(V (b) ))N−j−1. (2)
The proof is in Barut et al’s (2002) and the online Appendix A details the changes to
adapt it to the present set-up. In (2), V (b) is the inverse of the function B, which asso-
ciates bids to types. Existence of the inverse follows from monotonicity, the argument
for which is standard. The above expression is a straightforward adaptation of Eq. (2)
in Barut et al (2002, p 679). The function ZKN (b) is the probability that a candidate who
exerts effort b is successful when there are N posts and K competitors, when all other
candidates follow the bidding function B (vi) given in (1), and when the distribution
of types is F (v).
2For example, if teaching is highly valued by the potential members of the panel, then rational
candidates will “shift” their effort from research to teaching. De Philippis (2015) carries out an empirical
analysis of the teaching research trade-off for professors at Bocconi University in Italy. Becker (1975)
and (1979), or Mankiw (1998) among others have suggested that there might be complementarities in
the individual “production function”, that is that by doing research one becomes a better teacher and
vice versa, generating a positive correlation between teaching and research. This correlation could
alternatively be a spurious one, with an unobserved underlying variable “academic talent”, which
improves output in both activities (De Fraja and Valbonesi 2012).
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Figure 1:
Equilibrium effort by ability type
Note: The vertical axis measures the effort exerted by academics of different types, for the values
of the parameters close to the average sample values: fixed N = 150, K = 25, and x = 0.6.
If Z′KN (b) did not vary with x, then the effort exerted by each candidate type
would be proportional to a function of the competitive conditions. But because x
appears in V (b), then (1) and (2) determine an algebraically complex relationship
between the effort b and the parameters x, K, and N. We compute this relationship for
specific values of the parameter to understand how it changes in response to changes
in exogenous conditions. We do so in Figure 1, which plots the equilibrium effort level
(1), and in Figure 2, which shows how it changes following changes in x, K, and N.
In both figures, which are drawn in the special case when the density is constant and
so given by 11−v for z ∈ [v, 1], the horizontal axis shows an academic’s type v ∈ [v, 1],
when v = 0.15. In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the effort exerted as a function of
the academic’s type, and the parameters are chosen to be close to their average values
in the sample, given below in Table 3, N = 150, K = 25, x = 0.6 In Figure 2, the vertical
axis shows the change in the effort exerted by a type vi academic as a consequence of
an exogenous change in one of the parameters, given in the caption to the Figure. The
parameters are the same as in In Figure 1, with N increasing as the line becomes thicker
from a very low N = 33 to N = 80, to the sample value shown as the thickest one at
N = 150.
Note first of all the striking non-linearity of all the curves; academics of different
types respond very differently to changes in exogenous conditions. In Section 6, we
design our estimation strategy to capture these differences. The effect of changes of the
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Figure 2:
Changes in the parameters
Importance of publications The number of posts available The number of competitors.
Note: Effect on effort of changes in the three exogenous variables. In each panel, the baseline
values are x = 0.6, K = 25 and three values of N, which increases from 33 to 80 to 150 as the line
gets thicker and the dash longer. The LHS panel shows how effort changes as the importance
of publications increases by 0.043 from the baseline to 0.557. In the middle panel the number of
posts decreases by 3%; and in the RHS panel the number of competitors increases by 4%.
importance of publications in the determination of the winners, given by an increase
in x, is illustrated in the LHS panel of Figure 2. All types increase their effort, with
the effect varying considerably according to the academic’s type: productive types
respond more strongly, and the range of types who respond strongly depends on the
degree of competition. When competition is tough (high N, thick line, long dashes),
the increase in effort is concentrated among the most productive types. As competition
decreases, more academics increase their effort, though the increase flattens out for the
most productive academics, so that the proportional increase in effort is highest for
intermediate types. These are testable predictions.
In the other two panels, we show the effect of changes in the competitive condi-
tions. In the middle panel, a decrease in the number of posts; and in the RHS panel an
increase in the number of competitors. Not surprisingly, these two figures are similar.
We can see that an increase in competition, a lower value of K or a higher values of N,
decreases effort, except for productive academics when competition is relatively low
to begin with, see the thin solid lines in the middle and the RHS figures. The effect,
however, is not evenly distributed: there is a middle range of types who respond more
strongly, by reducing more their effort in the face of stiffer competition. This middle
range itself shifts towards more productive types when competition increases, compare
the troughs as the line becomes thicker, indicating stiffer competition. Also note how,
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when competition is low enough, productive types increase their effort in response to an
increase in competition, as the thinner curves show in the middle and the RHS panels.
Upon reflection, these comparative statics effects are intuitive. There are N com-
petitors for K posts. For all types, an increase in effort increases the likelihood of
gaining a position in the order. But the change in the cost-benefit balance of a decrease
in competition is different for different types, and this generates different responses to
change in the exogenous conditions. The reason is the only gain that matters is being
K-th instead of (K + 1)-th: in any other position in the ranking, the higher likelihood of
climbing in the ranking – whether above or below the threshold – is wasted effort. The
incentive of an extra post is highest for those who are more likely to be at the (K + 1)-
th position: since productive types are very likely to end up high up in the ranking,
they will be around the threshold position only if many of their competitors have also
drawn a very productive type, the chance of which is low, and so they do not change
effort much. By the same token, the least productive academics exert very little effort
to begin with and so are quite below the (K + 1)-th position, and the encouragement
effect of the higher chance of winning is very small. Middle types are instead quite
likely to be around the “borderline” position, where gaining one place in the ranking is
the difference between being appointed and not being appointed, making their effort
more likely to be useful and so increasing it in equilibrium as competition becomes
softer.3
We end this section by collecting the results illustrated in this discussion of Fig-
ures 1 and 2 into a formally stated conjecture, which constitutes the basis for our
econometric strategy.
Conjecture 1. (i) An increase in the importance of publications increases effort; the strength
of the effect increases for more productive academics, but at a decreasing rate for very produc-
tive academics. (ii) An increase in competition decreases effort for less productive academics.
(iii) This effect is strongest for academics with an intermediate value of the productivity pa-
rameter, and this intermediate range of types is shifted to the left when competition is weaker
(iv) Productive academics exert more effort as a consequence of an increase in competition,
unless competition is high.
3The situation is reminiscent of the discouragement effect of the follower in patent races, noted by
Fudenberg et al (1983), whereby the follower, less likely to win the race, reduces its R&D investment.
Our empirical analysis does suggest that this discouragement effect is present in our data, see below,
section 7, in particular Figure 7.
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3 Data
The theoretical analysis gives a number of predictions on the effort exerted by can-
didates to improve performance in a given dimension as a function of a number of
observable variables: the importance of the observable dimension of output for promo-
tion, which is given by the variable x, the competitiveness of the sector, determined by
the variables K and N, the legal environment which shapes the incentive mechanism,
and the distribution of types of the potential applicants for promotion.
Proposition 1 above shows that the effort exerted by academics is a strictly in-
creasing function of their type, given by the parameter measuring their utility cost
of effort. However, neither type nor effort are observable directly in the data we have.
We use the immediate consequence of Proposition 1 that in turn output is a strictly
increasing function of effort, and the lack of an independent measure of effort, to posit
the normalisation that one “unit” of effort produces precisely one unit of output.4 That
is we proxy effort with output, and we use this proxy for effort as the dependent
variable in our econometric strategy. This will therefore be based on the following
equation:
oits = α0 + αxxts + αKKts + αN Nts + γCCts + fi + ξt + σs + ζu + εits, (3)
where oist is the output of academic i, who, in period t, is in scientific sector s. xts,
Kts, and Nts are (functions) of the importance of publications, the number of posts,
and the number of competitors in scientific sector s in period t. Cts is a vector of time
varying controls, which include the share of women, the average age of the competi-
tors, the share of the appointments from outside Italian academia, and two homonymy
dummies defined below in Section 4.4. The fixed effects included in (3) account for
unobserved differences among individuals, fi, periods, ξt, scientific sectors, σs, and
universities, ζu.
We describe in detail our data in the rest of this section, and in Section 4 below we
explain how we constructed these variables from the data.
Our data comes from three sources, one collecting individuals, one their journal
publications, and the third the outlets where these appear. Information on individu-
4One potential pitfall of this normalisation is that the ranking of type and output is not robust at the
lower end of the type distributions, as shown in Figure 1, which shows that, for the typical parameters
of the sample, the effort and output of types below the median is similar. In our set-up this is not a
problem: many individuals in the lower half of the distribution have identical outputs, and so they are
assigned the same rank, that is the same type. Secondly, the regressions we report in the Tables group
together all individuals ranked below the median in their scientific sector.
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Table 1:
Number of professors by rank: 1990 and 2011.
1990 2011
Assistant Associate Full Assistant Associate Full
Number 15,158 14,542 12,006 24,596 16,618 15,244
Average age 39.62 47.85 52.68 44.93 52.55 58.64
5.55 6.69 7.79 8.32 8.13 7.20
Share females 0.41 0.25 0.10 0.45 0.34 0.19
Share WoK 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.68 0.61 0.69
Note: Standard deviation of age under the corresponding average. Share WoK is the
proportion of professors with at least one publication in the WoK dataset.
als is the administrative data from the Italian Ministry of Education, University and
Research (MIUR). The data contains information on everyone who held an academic
position in Italian universities, public or private,5 81,399 individuals in total. For every
year from 1990 to 2011, it reports everyone’s age and sex, their scientific sector, their
university affiliation, and their academic rank. With a handful of exceptions, every
person in the dataset has one of three ranks: assistant professor (ricercatore), associate
professor, and full professor (professore di seconda and di prima fascia, respectively). A
change in a person’s rank from one year to the next implies a promotion in the interven-
ing year. Table 1 presents two snapshots of the aggregate faculty in Italian universities,
at the beginning and at the end of the period we study. Table A4 in the appendix breaks
down this aggregate picture by broad disciplinary area, and throughout the period.
Once appointed, academics are tenured after a brief probation period. Some indi-
viduals exit the system before then; if they do so to pursue outside work opportunities,
such as a career in a foreign university, then they may face different incentives from
those provided by the promotion process considered here, embodied in the three vari-
ables K, N, and x. However, as we explained in detail in Section C.4 in the Appendix,
early exit is a rare event for assistants and associate professors, whose effort we aim to
explain.
At any given moment, each academic is allocated to one – and only one – of 371
“scientific sectors” (settore scientifico disciplinare), strictly separated from each other and
created at central level. There was no requirement that all members of a faculty or of a
department had to belong to the same scientific sector, and it was not uncommon for a
professor in a scientific sector to be in a faculty not closely related to his/her research
5At the end of 2012, the sector comprised 96 institutions (cercauniversita.cineca.it/index.php) col-
lectively enrolling 1,751,186 students (statistica.miur.it/ustat/Statistiche/IU home.asp) and employing
54,931 academics and 56,653 non-teaching staff. Public funding exceedse7bn. The overall cost of tertiary
education (including private expenses) is estimated at e14.8bn, 1% of GDP in 2010 (OECD 2013, Table
B2.1).
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interests. These sectors are very important for career progression, as appointments,
promotions, and all other evaluations are carried out within each scientific sector. For
example, if it is decided that a professor in sector SECS/P02 should be appointed at
the University of Bologna, then the appointment panel for this post will be composed
exclusively of professors from the same sector.6 These scientific sectors are fairly small,
their average number of full professors is 43, the standard deviation is 46, and the
size distribution is skewed, see Figure A1 in the Appendix.7 They are very stable in
composition: in the period we consider, only 1,504 assistant professor and 930 associate
professors, respectively 3% and 2.4% of the total, change scientific sector either before
or upon promotion, more detailed data is in Table A4 in the Appendix. Their small
size and the stability of their composition make each scientific sector a “small world”
where everyone knows everyone else, and suggests that our assumption is not far-
fetched that candidates are able to form an accurate assessment of the preferences of
the likely membership of the promotion and appointment panels.
Even though universities were given in the 1990s some managerial and financial
autonomy, university professors maintained their status of public employees: pay
scales8 and career progress were uniform across the country, mechanically determined
on the basis of seniority and age, and no merit pay was possible.
Academics had to be hired through public “competitions”, with rigid and uni-
form rules. All new posts for full and associate professors were authorised by the
government, and advertised simultaneously in all subject areas for all universities
(assistant professor positions were filled with a local interview process analogous to
the US and UK). Up to the end of the 90s, academics seeking to be promoted made a
single application, valid for all posts; this rule changed at the end of the century, as
we explain below, in Section 5.3. These national calls happened at approximately four
yearly intervals, as illustrated by Table 2. In theory, anybody could apply, though in
6With the exception of very small scientific sectors, where there might not be enough qualified
professors: professors from similar scientific sectors would be seconded in this case. Some of the panel
members may be associate professors (only in the associate professor appointments), some may be in
post at the University of Bologna some in post elsewhere, depending on the rules in force at the time the
vacancy opens.
7To fix ideas, practically all Italian economists are in SECS/P01 “Economics”, which comprised 341
full professors in 2007, SECS/P02 “Economic policy” (149 full professor in 2007), SECS/P03 “Public
economics” (107), SECS/P04 “History of economic thought” (20), SECS/P05 “Econometrics” (32),
SECS/P06 “Applied Economics” (63), SECS/P07 “Accounting” (229), SECS/P08 “Management” (176),
SECS/P09 “Finance” (24), SECS/P10 “Human resources” (41), SECS/P11“Banking” (105), SECS/P12
“Economic history” (66), SECS/P13 “Commodity economics” (48 full professors).
8The salary scales were (and are) overlapping: the lower rungs of the full professor scale being well
below the upper rungs of the associate professor’s scale, although promotions maintained length of
service so that did not imply a pay-cut.
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practice potential applicants were academics in the lower rank in the same scientific
sector, plus some from similar scientific sectors, and people from outside the Italian
university system. Horizontal moves were not possible.
The government also appointed the selection committees for these posts, one each
for the 371 scientific sectors. Selection committees choose all the appointees in their
scientific sector,9 in number equal to the number of posts. They did not, however,
specify which academic would go to which institution: this was left to subsequent
negotiations between “winners” and institutions.10 These panels had considerable
discretion in establishing criteria for promotion, in the spirit of the self-regulating
academia, including the relative importance of outputs and activities such as teaching
and contribution to the wider society.
In the set-up of the model, it is important to note that there were no “internal”
promotions. Someone who had been in post as associate professor in a university
had to wait for a full professor post to be advertised, and then apply to the national
competition like everyone else. Universities simply did not have the legal authority
to sanction a change of rank. This changed at the end of 2010, when another major
reform (Law n. 240) introduced, among other changes, internal promotion, and made
our model less applicable: for this reason, our analysis of career progress ends then.
The second data source is the record of research publications by Italian academics.
We have obtained it from the web-version of the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge
(formerly ISI, WoK hereafter).11 This proprietary dataset indexes more than 12,000
journals in the fields of arts, humanities, sciences and social sciences.12 For each article,
the dataset reports the title, each author’s surname and first initial, their affiliations,
the journal where it appears, and the number of times it is cited by a WoK indexed
publication. From this dataset, we have downloaded every article published in the
9These selection committees were formed using a combination of election (by peers) and random
draw all full professors (for full professor posts) and all the full and associate professors (for associate
professor posts), all within each scientific sector. Thus, for example, funding for 44 new associate
professorships in economics was provided in 1996. The 44 holders of these posts were appointed by
a nine person panel which worked in 1997/98. See Checchi (1999) for a detailed account of this process.
10Importantly, these negotiations did not affect pay in any way, as institutions had no freedom
whatsoever to alter a person’s salary, or teaching load, both being determined by law, pay according
to the years of service. Institutions could not even refund moving costs.
11The main alternative bibliometric sources are Scopus and Google Scholar. Scopus has a less full
coverage of the sciences (Klavans and Boyak, 2007). At the time of writing, Google Scholar has some
reliability problems (Lo´pez-Co´zar et al 2014). At any rate, the literature comparing the Scopus and
WoK databases (Archambault et al 2009) documents high correlations among the bibliometric measures
derived from these different sources.
12Most of the analyses we have come across are carried out by economists on economists (Bosquet
and Combes (2013) a recent contribution); among the exceptions, Kelchtermans and Veugelers (2011),
and Dietza (2005).
12
Table 2:
Promotions and Appointments
Period from Assist. from Assoc. from Assist. from Outside from Outsideto Assoc. to Full to Full to Assoc. to Full
1990-1994 2,539 1,619 83 1,034 116
1995-1998 2,441 301 46 492 61
1999-2002 7,064 6,462 198 1,475 203
2003-2006 4,879 3,639 50 1,180 122
2007-2011 2,252 1,448 22 397 82
Total 19,175 13,469 399 4,578 584
Note: Number of promotions to associate and full professor in each period, according
to the academic’s previous rank.
period 1990-2011 where at least one author listed an Italian institution among their
affiliations. This harvest yielded almost two million publications, which required a
considerable amount of “cleaning” work, described in greater detail in Verzillo (2013).
It seems plausible that in some scientific sectors publications in journals not included
in the WoK, for example Italian journals, might be important from a career viewpoint.
For these scientific sectors, publications in non-WoK journals are implicitly included in
a person’s other academic activities.
We have linked this dataset to the Journal Citation Report, also from Thomson
Reuters, our third source of data. This allowed us to attach to every journal the im-
pact factor over the years between 2008 and 2012, as well as the research areas where
each journal belongs. Details of the procedure we followed are in Section C.5 in the
Appendix. After cleaning the dataset, we are left with 1,142,971 papers.
The focus of our paper is on promotions: these are accurately determined as a
change in rank in the administrative database described in Section 4.2. Table 2 sum-
marises the number of promotions and appointments recorded in our dataset. Some
individuals became associate or full professors without having previously held a lower
rank post, see the last two columns in Table 2, which Table A3 in the Appendix breaks
down by broad research areas. These were individuals working outside the Italian
university system, in Italy or abroad. We exclude them from the estimations, because
the incentives under which they operate prior to their appointment may differ from
those operating in the Italian university system. We also exclude them from our sample
individuals who change sector on promotion (as we mention, they are between 2% and
3% of our sample), as they may differ systematically from the rest of the population. So,
to sum up, we run two separate regressions of (various versions of) equation (3), one
for assistant professors trying to become associate, the other for associate professors
trying to become full professor. In each of these two regressions, an academic is in the
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regression sample in period t if they are in the corresponding rank in period t, or if
they are in the rank for the first time, and they were in a lower rank in period t − 1.
Section C.1 in the Appendix illustrates some examples.
4 Constructing the variables
4.1 Individual effort in a period
As explained, effort is proxied by output, and, we measure output as the count of
the publications in WoK journals published by a given professor in a given period,
weighted with a function of the number of authors. We follow Checchi’s (1999) weight-
ing, 1
1+ N−12
, where N is the number of authors. This implies that having two papers
with one co-author is a higher output than having one single-authored paper, and
reflects the practice of forming a first impression of someone’s vita by looking at its
“length”. Using the perhaps more straightforward weighting given by 1N makes no
qualitative difference to any of the results.13 An alternative to a simple count is to
weight publications with their importance, measured by the impact factor ranking of
the journal. In view of the large differences of this measure in different research areas,
a coarsely defined ranking seems preferable. Thus we assign a weight of 4 to a paper
appearing in a journal in the top quartile in the impact factor ranking of all the journals
in the 30 or so subdisciplines (defined by the Journal Citation Report as explained in
Section C.5 in the Appendix), a weight of 2 to a paper in a journal in the third quartile,
and a weight of 1 to a paper in a journal below the median, or with no reported impact
factor.14 The correlation between these two measures is 0.856, and hence it is not
surprising that regressions run with either give very similar results, as shown by the
comparison between columns 3 and 4 with 7 and 8 in Table 5.
Different disciplines have widely different standards regarding the quantity and
type of publications, as anyone is aware who has sat in a university-wide promotion
committee; Abramo et al’s (2014) empirical evidence confirms that this is the case in
Italy as well. For this reason we normalise each person’s output with the average
output of the full professors in the same scientific sector in the same period. Formally,
13Abramo et al (2014) suggest weighting differently the first and the last authors in science publica-
tions: we have calculated output with this weighting pattern for sciences, and obtained a correlation
of 0.926 with our chosen measure of output, suggesting that our results would not change qualitatively
with the Abramo et al weighting pattern.
14The correlation of our chosen weighting with other plausible ones is consistently well above 0.9.
Taking a position in the ranking rather than the measure of the impact factor reduces the influence
of differences in the impact factors of journals in different disciplines, documented among others in
Althouse et al (2009). At any rate, we have also run our analysis weighting papers with the natural log
of (1 plus) the journal impact factor, with no noticeable changes.
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define oits the output of person i in scientific sector s in period t. Let Pit be the set
of publications by person i in period t; let Fst be the set of full professors in scientific
sector s in period t. Finally, let wp be the weight, by number of authors or by impact
factor, of publication p. We measure oits by
oits =
∑p∈Pit wp
∑ f∈Fst ∑p∈P f t wp
#Fst
. (4)
In (4), the numerator is person i’s weighted number of publications. At the denom-
inator, ∑p∈P f t wp is the weighted number of publications written in period t by full
professor f ; this is averaged over all the full professors f ∈ Fs in the scientific sector s
at the end of period t; recall that #Fst denotes the number of elements in the set Fst.
4.2 The number of posts, Kts, and of competitors, Nts
Since the determination of the index x uses the values of K and N, we describe these
first. Kts is the number of new positions available in period t in scientific sector s:
this is given by the number of individuals who are promoted to a professorship in the
period, or appointed from outside the scientific sector. Given that, during the period
we consider, there was no separate channel for internal promotions, academics who
changed rank without changing university were in fact competing with all those who
held the same rank in the same scientific sector in different universities or outside the
system. We do not observe the appointment process, and we derive K from the data
simply as the number of all “new entries” into that rank.15
We do not have information on who applied for the available positions, and there-
fore we define N as the number of potential applicants, information which can be
inferred from our dataset.16 Recall that N matters because it affects the beliefs aca-
demics hold about the extent of the competition they face, not as the actual number of
applicants: our assumption, therefore, amounts to each academic viewing all potential
applicants as competitors. In detail, for the associate professorships, we calculate Nts
as the sum of three groups: (i) the assistant professors who are in scientific sector s
during any year in the period, (ii) those that are assistant professors in the last year of
15Measuring the number of posts in this way would underestimate K if someone appointed in
February leaves her post before December. This however is a very rare event, and so counting the
number of new professors in a given rank is an appropriate proxy for K.
16This is unlike Bosquet et al (2013), and so our analysis should be seen as a reduced form of a two-
stage model where individuals first choose whether to apply and, if they do, are chosen for appointment.
Unlike Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) and Zinovyeva et al (2017), we cannot control for the identities of
the members of the appointment panel.
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the previous period, and were appointed as associate professor in the initial year of the
period, (iii) and the assistant professors who become associate professors in scientific
sector s from being assistant professor in a different scientific sector. Likewise for full
professor appointments: Nts is the number of associate professor in scientific sector s,
in any year in the period or in the last year of the previous period, plus the number
of new full professors in scientific sector s who were not in scientific sector s, but
excluding those who were appointed from outside the system. There are very few such
appointments, and so excluding them does not alter our measure of N by much. Since
the reason N matters is that it affects the effort of the other competitors, excluding these
outside competitors implies that academics in a given scientific sector did not expect, at
the time they choose their effort, these “outsiders” to be among their competitors. As a
robustness test, we run the regression including them, with almost identical results, as
shown in the last two columns in Table A7. For analogous reasons, we do not include as
competitors for full professorships the assistant professors in the same scientific sector.
This implies that the associate professors in a given scientific sector did not consider
assistant professors as credible applicants for full professorships. This is plausible
given the low number of direct promotions from assistant to full professor (see the
last column of Table 2).
4.3 The importance of publications in refereed journals, xts
There does not exist an obvious measure for the importance of refereed international
publications in an academic appointment process.
When the panel appoint K new professors from a pool of N applicants, they are
performing a selection of K elements from a set of N elements. These elements, the
candidates, can be ordered according to various measures of performance. We take as
the measure of the importance of publications the “closeness” of the selection to the
ordering determined by that which would be determined on the basis of a synthetic
measure of their publication output. In the present context, for this to make sense, it
is necessary to have a tool which can compare selections of different sizes from sets
of different sizes. We develop elsewhere (Checchi et al 2018) precisely this tool, an
“orderliness” index of arbitrary selections from arbitrary ordered sets, and in this paper
we take this index as the measure of the importance of international publications. This
index, constructed to satisfy a number of natural axioms, assigns to any selection from
any set, a number between 0 and 1, in such a way that, given any two selections from
any two ordered sets, if one selection is “closer” than the other to the selection that
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Table 3:
Summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions.
Assistant Associate Full
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd
Output 0.269 0.521 0.355 0.673 1.00 0.497
Output weighted with IF 0.391 1.122 0.514 2.047 1.00 4.160
Orderliness index 0.605 0.127 0.607 0.128
Number of posts K 28.1 29.4 20.0 21.4
Number of competitors N 164.8 141.2 145.1 120.6
Average age in the sector 43.8 4.2 50.8 4.1 56.9 3.4
Share of women in the sector 0.418 0.186 0.299 0.177 0.162 0.139
Broad homonymy dummy 0.277 0.276 0.288
Narrow homonymy dummy 0.007 0.006 0.007
Sector: Science 0.251 0.249 0.251
Medicine 0.129 0.130 0.126
Engineering 0.177 0.176 0.177
Arts, Hum. & Law 0.352 0.354 0.354
Social Sciences 0.091 0.091 0.091
Region: North East 0.228 0.216 0.220
North West 0.195 0.219 0.208
Centre 0.279 0.273 0.298
South and Islands 0.298 0.293 0.275
Observations 127,078 107,939 89,757
Note: “Mean” and “sd” are the values computed over the individual-period sample.
Output for full professors is the reference value for the scientific sector, and so has
mean identically 1. IF is the impact factor. The number of observations is professors
times periods.
would be made if only the highest ranked elements had been selected, then the value of
the index assigned to the first selection is higher than the value assigned to the second
selection. The axioms specified in Checchi et al (2018) specify formally the meaning of
“closer” and identify this index uniquely as:
xts =
rts,max − rts
rts,max − rts,min . (5)
In (5), rts is the sum of the ranks of the candidates appointed in period t in scientific
sector s, and rts,max and rts,min are the maximum and the minimum possible values that
the sum of the ranks of the winners could take, which occur, respectively, when the K
worst and the K best candidates are selected. Thus xts would be 0 in a scientific sector
where all the appointees in a period have lower output (and so higher rank) than all the
non-appointees (rts = rts,max), and vice versa xts would take value 1 if all the winners
had higher output than all the non-winners (rts = rts,min).17
17Ties in ordering cause a problem when only some of the tied candidates are selected. When this
happens, we simply rank the tied candidates randomly, and calculate the value of the index x for that
sector for that period as the average calculated values for a large number of repetitions.
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To calculate the index xts according to (5), we need to determine the ordering of
the candidates in each scientific sector and each period. We do not construct this
ranking using the measure of output developed in Section 4.1, which considers only
the publications in the given period. This is because the appointment panels typi-
cally evaluate the contribution of candidates over their entire career, and also have
discretion to judge the influence and importance of an applicants’ work. We therefore
combine information of past output with information on the importance of this output.
In practice, to determine a person’s ranking in scientific sector s in period t, we take
the first factor of a principal component extraction of two measures: a candidate’s
cumulative output up to period t, and her real h-index18 in the last year of period t,
and so it is affected by productivity, seniority and influence. The cumulative output
we use to determine a person’s ranking among those competing for promotion in her
given scientific sector in a given period is in general different from the measure of her
output in the same period .We note here that the orderliness x of a scientific sector
varies considerably from promotion to associate to promotion to full professor: the
correlation between the two indices is 0.263.
So, to sum up, the importance of refereed international publications in scientific
sector s in period t, xts, is calculated by first ranking all the N potential applicants in
period t in scientific sector s, then by adding up the ranks of the K appointed candi-
dates, the determination of K and N given in Section 4.2 above, and finally by applying
the formula in (5). The variable x thus takes the same value for all academics in each
scientific sector, and of course it varies from period to period; if it were calculated on
the basis of the same information as the individual output on the LHS, it would be
loosely analogous to the peer effect. It still differs from it in that it is calculated on the
lifetime publication and citation record, whereas the individual output is determined
only by the current period publications only. Table 3 reports the summary statistics
for this index, but it is worth delving more into its distribution. In general, one would
expect considerable differences in the value of this index for different scientific sectors,
given that in some broad research areas publication in Italian language outlets may
matter as much or more than international ones. It is therefore perhaps surprising
that this remains the case within each broad research areas, as Figure 3 illustrates: this
18Recall that an author has index h if h of her Np papers have at least h citations each, and the other(
Np − h
)
papers have no more than h citations each (Hirsch 2005). The real h-index, a refinement
proposed by Guns and Rousseau (2009, p 67, expression (6)), is the intersection of the 45◦ line in the
Cartesian diagram with the number of papers ranked by number of citations on the horizontal axis, and
the number of citations on the vertical axis and the line segment joining the least cited paper above the
diagonal and the most cited paper below it. Further details can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 3:
Kernel density of the index of orderliness by scientific sector.
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Note: Kernel density of the index of orderliness in the scientific sectors within each of 29 broad
research areas. The bibliometric vs non-bibliometric split reflects the classification made by the
Italian government for the purpose of a later evaluation exercise.
could be due to correlation between overall quality of publications and quality of the
international publications.
4.4 Dealing with homonymy
There are people with the same surname and initial. This creates two distinct problems.
Firstly, there are professors who hold a post at an Italian university and who share
surname and initial with an individual who appears in a paper with an affiliation in
the same university without holding in that year a post of professor: typically PhD
students, or post-docs, or medical doctors working in a university hospital. Secondly,
there are individuals who share their name and first initial with another academic
employed in the same year by the same university. Unlike the first group, we can
quantify this second: there are 4969 such individuals (6.1% of the total), and, of these,
846 (1.04% of the total) also share the same broad research area.19 We address the
19Two hypothetical examples illustrate the problems: suppose first that Ernesto Maserati is employed
by the faculty of engineering of the university of Bologna, where there are no other E. Maserati, but
someone called Ettore Maserati has published an article whilst working at a hospital affiliated with the
university of Bologna; this article would be attributed by our download procedure to Ernesto. The
second problem would happen if the university of Modena employs in a given year Enzo Ferrari in the
faculty of medicine and Emilia Ferrari in the economics faculty.
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problems caused by homonymy with a heuristic disambiguation strategy, described in
detail in the appendix, and similar in spirit to the one used in D’Angelo et al (2011),
which also has an extensive bibliography on the topic.
The first type of misattribution of publications due to homonymy is a measurement
error which does not introduce bias: there is no reason to think that an art historian
should be more likely to have a WoK publishing homonym than an engineer, and there-
fore homonymy is not correlated with characteristics of interest, such as the competi-
tiveness of the scientific sector, or the importance of WoK publications for promotion.
The disambiguation strategy simply improves the efficiency of the estimations. The
second cause of homonymy could however be due to “nepotism”, the appointment to
professorships of undeserving individuals thanks to the influence of their relations.20
If nepotism is unevenly distributed across disciplines (differences in geographical
areas, such as those pointed out by Durante et al (2011) should be accounted for by the
university fixed effects), it may have a separate effect from the index x, and so control-
ling for it reduces the omitted variable bias. We therefore include additional controls
to account for the possibility of nepotism, in the shape of two dummies which measure
low and high probability of nepotism. We exploit the idea, suggested by the literature
mentioned above, that whilst family members are more likely than two unrelated
individuals to share the surname, they are not more likely to share the same initial.
The dummy indicating low probability takes value 1 if individual i has a colleague
with the same surname, though not necessarily the same initial, in the databases, in
the same year working outside their university and outside their scientific discipline.
The second dummy denotes high probability of a homonym being a relation by taking
value 1 if the individual i has a colleague with the same surname, again possibly a
different initial, working in the same year in the same university and the same scientific
sector. Notice that while a person’s surname does not change, the value of the dummies
can change from period to period with changes in the composition of the rest of the
professoriate. Of course we cannot identify situations where a person is promoted
because their output is artificially inflated by their relation’s unethical practices.21
20Because relations are more likely to bear the same surname, evidence that the concentration
of homonymy is higher among university colleagues than it would be in a random sample of the
population is interpreted as evidence of nepotism (Durante et al 2011; see also Allesina 2011, Moss
2012, Perotti 2008 and Scoppa 2009).
21As for example reported in the press (la Repubblica, 10 May 2000) by Antonio Iavarone, currently
professor at Columbia University, “The professor of paediatrics, Renato Mastrangelo, required us to
include the name of his son among the authors of our scientific publications; [...] around 25 publications
are attributed to his son even though he did not contribute to them”. While an econometric analysis
based on output could identify undeserving relations promoted beyond what their record suggests,
in the presence of an output level justifying promotion, without intimate knowledge of the genesis of
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5 Empirical strategy
5.1 Dealing with sorting by scientific sector, I: orderliness.
The large number of scientific sectors is crucial to our empirical strategy, as it lends
plausibility to the assumption that candidates can reliably predict the importance which
their appointment and promotion panels will attribute to publications in refereed jour-
nals. It however raises a potential endogeneity issue in the allocation of academics
to scientific sectors. With many narrowly defined scientific sectors, it is possible that
academics may self-select into different scientific sectors within the same research area:
thus candidates and panellists would share the same attitude towards the relative
importance of publications and other activities. For example, if biologists with a com-
parative advantage in publishing in refereed journals all opt for a given scientific sector
within biology, and the others opt instead for a different one, then the correlation
between individual productivity and selection criteria would be a spurious one, gener-
ated by the correlation of both variables with the unobservable comparative advantage
for publishing in refereed journals in both sets of agents, the panel members and the
applicants. The large number of scientific sectors, and the variability of the index x
within broad research area shown by Figure 3 makes this a potential problem, as it is
clearly relatively easy for an academic to choose the scientific sector within their broad
area.
To deal with this problem, we instrument the index of orderliness with two vari-
ables which capture the degree of homogeneity of the leadership of a scientific sector,
the set of full professors from where the membership of the panel will be chosen. These
variables are the standard deviation of the research output of the full professors, and
the number of associate and assistant professors per full professor in the sector.22 The
idea is inspired by the more objective nature of a publication count, which may serve
as a default option should the leadership of the scientific sector fail to determine a
less objective criterion. Thus a large group of full professors with different publication
records may find it more difficult to agree on a subjective criterion, be it the quality of
teaching or the extent of the engagement with the wider society, than a smaller group
of academics with similar balance between publications and other academic activities.
each article, we cannot distinguish whether the influence of a father on his son’s output is through
undue pressure on third parties to improve his son’s publications record or through high quality genetic
inheritance.
22Taking each of these measures in turn, or averaging them out, or changing the way they are
calculated does not affect the results.
21
5.2 Dealing with sorting, II: posts and competitors.
By the same token, having small scientific sector within which competition is chan-
nelled certainly improves academics’ precision in assessing both N and K, the likely
number of academics who will be competing and the likely number of posts competed
over. These magnitudes can be reasonably linked to the number of young and old
academics, the former affecting the number of applicants for future jobs, and the latter
the future pattern of retirements and hence the number of jobs. And as with the
importance of publications in refereed journals, smaller scientific sectors exacerbate the
peril of academics within a broad research area sorting according to their comparative
advantage into sectors with different values of N and K. To deal with this potential
spurious correlation between N or K and the academics’ individual characteristics
which might emerge if academics sorted themselves into different scientific sectors
within their broad research area, we exploit a change in an important detail in the
nature of the appointment process.
The centralised mechanism regulating promotions and appointments in Italian uni-
versities described above, in Section 3, was radically changed at the end of the 1990s
with Law 3 July 1998, n 210. This was approved in October 1998, came into effect
after the summer of 1999, so that the first promotions under the new rules took place
towards the end of 1999. The main thrust of the reform was to decentralise the appoint-
ment process, making it closer to the US and UK model: instead of having to choose
from the closed list of the winners of the national competition, which often it had had
no input in, when an institution received funding to fill a post in a given scientific
sector, a national panel was appointed, whose task it was to appoint to that specific
post.23
A second aspect of the reform can potentially affect the equilibrium effort level
derived theoretically in Section 2. Aside from the switch from national to local com-
petition, the law introduced the restriction that the number of applications that a can-
didate could submit in each year could not exceed five. The rationale behind this rule
was to reduce the workload for appointment committees, by limiting the number of
applications to a given post. While the decentralisation affected all academics equally,
this second aspect of the reform affected different academics differently. This is so
23The composition of the panel changed only marginally with the reform, with the inclusion of one
representative of the institution where the selected candidate would be appointed. Some other details
were changed: while each competition was for one post at a given university, the panel could, and
typically did, qualify up to two additional candidates (later reduced to one), who could subsequently be
appointed to a different university, without an additional selection process.
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because all academics faced the same cap of five applications per year, but the number
of new post varied widely by scientific sector, because it depended not only on the
size of the scientific sector, which was itself varied widely, as we showed in footnote
7, but also to esoteric unknowables such as the pattern of relative clouts of each sci-
entific sector within the faculties in the universities where funds for appointments
within the period were allocated.24 If at the start of their career academics could
reasonably anticipate the future trend in the number of posts and competitors in the
various scientific sectors, and perhaps even the possibility of a decentralisation in the
appointment process in line with international practice, few could have predicted a
rule imposing a cap on applications, let alone one of unpredictable tightness. This
makes the tightness of the post-reform constraint as good as random, and creates
a convenient quasi-experimental environment, one which can address the potential
problem of academics self-sorting into sectors according to their different competitive
conditions. Appendix E.3 suggests that, indeed, whether or not the constraint was tight
was not correlated with the pre-reform output.
We capture empirically the role of this constraint on different individuals, by cre-
ating a variable R, “Constraints on applications”, which is obtained by counting the
number of posts filled in each post-reform year in each scientific sector, attributing a
score of 0, 1, 2 according to whether the number of posts filled in that year is less than
5, between 5 and 12, and more than 12, respectively.25 This variable is set to zero before
1999. As with homonymy, making the variable categorical indicates low, medium, and
high likelihood of the constraint binding, reflecting our inability exactly to determine
whether the constraint is in fact binding at the time of a person’s promotion, due to
erratic time lags between the opening of a vacancy and its filling.
The distribution of this variable is illustrated in Figure 4. The vertical bars on the
LHS measure the number of professors who had low, medium or high probability of
facing the constraint in a given year after the reform. The RHS panel reports, in each
year, the mean value in the year, both for assistants and for associate professors.
The potential role of this detail of the reform can be gleaned from the Table 4. The
24For example if the central administration of a university allocates a post to the faculty of economics,
then it is up to the faculty of economics to choose whether the appointee should belong to one scientific
sector rather than another. This might depend on short term teaching needs and the current relative
number of professors in the various economics scientific sectors, and is almost impossible to predict in
advance.
25There is a degree of arbitrariness in these numbers, to take into account, mentioned above in
footnote 23 the additional promotions that the panels could award without increasing the number of
applications formally made by the candidates. Modifying these boundaries within reasonable values
hardly changes the estimated coefficients.
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Figure 4:
Distribution of the R variable
Frequency of R by year
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Note: On the LHS panel, the vertical axis measures the number of professors who faced a weak,
when the value of R is 0, medium, R = 1, and tight, R = 2, constraint on applications in
their scientific sector in each year. The RHS panel measures the yearly average of R, which is
identically 0 prior to the 1999 reform, as explained in the text.
four top left cells in each half of the table show the average output (in log) of assistant
and associate professors, relative to the output of full professors in their discipline.
Academics in each group are divided into two sets according to a threshold value of a
variable that measures how tight the constraint on the number of application is in their
scientific sector. Both groups are shown to increase their output after the reform, but
the professors who were constrained by the limit of the number of applications, both
assistant and associate, appear to increase their output by less than those who were
less constrained.
5.3 The 1999 reform in theory.
The figures in Table 4 are raw population averages and so they ignore both the non-
linearities highlighted in Section 2 which suggest that different academics respond
differently to changes in conditions, and the other factors influencing effort. A formal
theoretical analysis is needed to unravel the overall effect, and we therefore begin by
adapting Proposition 1 to the rules set by the new law. We consider the decentralisation
first. The rules allowed different panels in the same scientific sector to make their
selection according to different criteria, and anecdotal evidence suggests that they did
so. We capture this by assuming that when there are K posts available, there are also K
different panels, each assigning one post, and by interpreting x as the probability that
each of these panels appoints on the basis of the ranking determined by the publica-
tions in refereed journals. Thus, with probability xK all posts are assigned on the basis
of publications alone, with probability KxK−1 (1− x) all but one are, with probability
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Table 4:
Academics’ output Pre- and Post-reform.
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Assistant Professors
Unconstrained scientific sector 1.484 1.926 0.442
Constrained scientific sector 1.781 2.036 0.254
Difference-in-difference 0.188
Associate Professors
Unconstrained scientific sector 1.595 2.012 0.417
Constrained scientific sector 1.87 2.214 0.343
Difference-in-difference 0.074
Note: Each cell reports the average output of assistant (top part of the table) and associate (bottom
part) professors, relative to the the output of full professors working in the same scientific sector.
The label “Constrained scientific sector” identifies the subset of professors who were registered
in scientific sectors where the rule on the constraint on application in force after the 1999 reform
was above a given threshold, and vice versa.
K!
2!(K−2)! x
K−2 (1− x)2 all but two are, and so on, until, with probability (1− x)K, none
is.26 This changes the link between a candidate’s effort and her probability of winning,
and so, for given K, N, and x, her payoff and thus her incentive to exert effort is
different in the post-reform environment.
The cap on the number of applications that a candidate can make in each year can
be modelled formally as follows. Consider one of N candidate competing for K posts,
and let M be the limit to the number of positions that each candidate could apply for
in a year. The K posts are assigned through K competitions, each appointing to one
post. When K > M, the game is richer than that studied in Section 2, because the
candidates who face a constrain choose, in addition to effort, which of the posts to
apply for. As before, there are no entry costs, so it is payoff maximising for every
candidate to enter as many competitions as allowed, and each candidate therefore
applies for K̂ = min {K, M} positions. When K > M, the game has many pure strategy
equilibria, and one mixed strategy equilibrium. Denoting by bMNK c the integer part of
NM
K , in each pure strategy equilibrium, there two groups of posts:
(
K− (MN mod K)
)
posts have bMNK c applications and (MN mod K) posts have
(bMNK c+ 1) applications.
In the mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium each player applies to any given post
with probability MK , so that all competitions have, in expectation, the same number of
candidates, NMK . Thus we define the expected number of candidates in each competi-
tion as N̂ = N min
{M
K , 1
}
. Since no one can hold more than one post, if a candidate
26This is the extreme case where a panel either relies exclusively on the publications, or ignores them
completely. In the polar case where each panel uses the same criterion and gives weight x to publications
and (1− x) to other criteria, the situation is the same as in the national competition: it is still the case
that to be promoted it is necessary to be one of the K top ranked among the N applicants.
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receives multiple offers, she must reject all but one of them, and so each post not taken
is filled with the next preferred available candidate.
We can now extend Proposition 1 to the post-reform environment.
Proposition 2. When K separate “local” panels appoint to the K posts, and candidates can
apply to at most M posts, the optimal strategy for each of the N candidates is to exert effort
towards publishing in refereed journals given by
B (vi) =
∑K̂−1k=0 (
K̂
k)x
K̂−k (1− x)k ∫ viv yZ′K̂−k,N̂−k (y) dy
∑K̂−1k=0 (
K̂
k) (1− x)Kˆ−k xk
, (6)
where ZKN (v) is defined above in (2), and K̂ = min {K, M}, and N̂ = N min
{M
K , 1
}
.27
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of the reform on effort. It reproduces the black solid
line in Figure 1 and adds to it the two red lines which depict the effort levels when
the restriction on the number of applications is not binding (the dash-dotted line)
and when this restriction is binding (the dotted line). The curves show that more
productive academics exert less effort: the negative effect on effort of the switch to local
competition is reinforced by the cap on applications. The less productive academics, on
the other hand, exert more effort after the reform when they are registered in a sector
where the cap on the number of applications is binding. Recall that whether this cap
was binding in a year depends not only on the size of the scientific sector, but also the
pattern of appointments in the different institutions and scientific sectors.
As in Section 2, we can collect the testable implications described above in a for-
mally stated conjecture. Recall that we have postulated a one-to-one relationship be-
tween effort and output.
Conjecture 2. (i) Ceteris paribus, more productive academics reduce effort after the reform.
(ii) Academics with a lower value of the productivity parameter exert more effort following the
reform if they are in a scientific sector where the cap on the number of applications is binding.
6 Econometric specification
As we anticipated at the end of Section 3, we estimate our model on two unbalanced
panels, one comprising assistant professors aiming to become associate, the other as-
sociate professors aiming to become full professor. The panel structure allows us to
control for the influence on effort of individual characteristics with the individual fixed
27Since N̂ may be non-integer, factorial is replaced by the gamma function when appropriate.
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Figure 5:
Equilibrium effort by ability type pre- and post-reform
Note: The curves denote the effort exerted by academics of different types, measured along
the horizontal axis, for fixed N = 150, K = 25, x = 0.6. The solid black line is the same as
in Figure 1, measuring the pre-reform effort, the function in (1). The post-reform equilibrium
level of effort is shown by the red lines, determined in Proposition 2: the dotted line depicts the
full effect of the reform, obtained in (6), the dash-dotted red line is the effect the reform would
have if the cap on the number of applications, set in the example at M = 5, were absent.
effects. Although we have yearly observation both for promotions and for output, it
is preferable to choose, for the time dimension of the panel, a longer interval. As we
explained, prior to the 1999 reform, all the appointments in each scientific sector in
a funding cycle happened at the same time. Moreover, ministerial funding for new
professorial posts was not staggered across scientific sectors, so that the pattern of
appointments shows distinct peaks prior to the turn of the century: the overwhelming
majority of the appointees began working in the same year, a different year of each
cycle for associate and full professors. Some appointments began in different years:
this was usually due to delays in the completion of the committee’s decision process or
by appeals by rejected candidates. While individual appointments within a scientific
sector were no longer necessarily simultaneous after the 1999 reform, in practice, the
funding cycle did not change under the new rules: all posts, for all scientific sectors,
were advertised simultaneously, and the thousands of appointment panels worked in
parallel. Thus the highly uneven pattern of appointments continued after 2000. Given
this dramatic bunching, it seems preferable to smooth it out by aggregating several
years into one period, which therefore constitutes the time unit of our panel. The
four year length of a period is a very close approximation to the temporal pattern of
27
Figure 6:
Timeline for competitions for appointments and promotions.
x1s ,
K1s ,
N1s
x2s ,
K2s ,
N2s
\ref{timeline}
\caption{A simplified timeline for the period considered.}
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appointments, and leads to the aggregation into five periods presented in Table 2.28 A
longer time unit than one year also reflects the gap between the exertion of effort and
the publication of the output resulting from that effort. A separate concern could be
the existence of a link, for example one created by policy, between productivity and the
number of new posts. As Section E.4 in the Appendix argues, there is no discernible
pattern suggesting that K and N are determined by the natural pattern of promotions,
retirements, and change in the overall student numbers.
Figure 6 illustrates schematically the sequence of events. At the beginning of each
period, candidates form beliefs about the conditions which will be in force at the time
the decision on their application for promotion is made, described by the parameters,
xts, Kts, Nts, and Rts, the importance of publications for promotion, the number of
posts, the number of competitors, and, from period 3, the tightness of the constraint in
period t and in scientific sector s. These variables have of course the same values for
all individuals in the same rank within a scientific sector in each period, and vary by
scientific sector and by period. Given these beliefs, the candidates choose how much
effort to exert towards publications relative to effort towards other activities. Effort
determines publications, which are the individual’s output in that period. At the end
of the period, the appointment panel assess the candidates. The shaded area is the
post-reform period, when competitions were local and there was a constraint on the
number of applications per year.
Thus our panel dataset has “professor-period” as the unit of observation; it is
unbalanced, as some professors are only present in some periods. In practice, of course,
some individual characteristics may change from period to period as they are influ-
enced by events unfolding in time, rather than solely by features fixed at entry into the
28We have also experimented with different subdivisions for the two panels, one for associate and a
different one for full professors, and the results do not vary.
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panel.
To incorporate the discussion at the end of in Section 5, which suggests that, fol-
lowing the reform, the relevant values of the parameter K and N are in fact K̂ and
N̂, to take into account the possible presence of the constraint on applications. As
explained above, we do not know the precise number of applications allowed to each
individual in each period, and we therefore proxy N̂ts with Nts + λRts, where Rts is the
variable that measures the intensity of the reform in sector s in period t. The first three
coefficients of (3) and the interaction of the number of competitors with the variable
R, which measures the strength of the constraint are obtained as panel estimations for
the two groups of professors we consider, assistant and associate. The estimates are
reported below, with the standard errors below the coefficients, and the stars denoting
the usual significance thresholds.
oits = α0 + .045∗∗∗
0.011
xts − 0.013∗∗∗
0.004
Kts +
(
0.171∗∗∗
0.027
− 0.01∗∗∗
0.002
Rts
)
Nts + γCCts + εitsu, (7)
oits = α0 + .01
0.01
xts + 0.014∗∗∗
0.004
Kts +
(
0.035∗
0.019
− 0.006∗∗∗
0.001
Rts
)
Nts + γCCts + εitsu, (8)
where the fixed effects are all included in the error term. The estimated equations (7),
for assistant professors, and (8), for associate professors, show the anticipated signs for
xts and RtsNts, though the former is not statistically significant for associate professors.
The theoretical analysis does not lead us to expect a specific sign for Kts and Nts.
The estimates reported above have all the expected sign. However, they calculate
the average effect on effort, and thus inevitably neglect the strongly non-linear rela-
tionship between an academic’s position in the distribution of types in her scientific
sector, and her responses to changes in the parameters which we established in the
the theoretical analysis. To account for these non-linearities, we begin by dividing the
sample into groups of professors of similar type. Formally, we letQ be a partition of the
set of associate (respectively, assistant) professors in sector s in period t, and for q ∈ Q,
we let δqits = 1 if individual i is in the subset q ∈ Q in period t, and δqits = 0 otherwise.
That is, we attach to each individual the percentile of her position, in each period, in
the ordering of the academics in her rank. Since Q is a partition, ∑q∈Q δqits = 1. We
then run four separate regressions for both sets of individuals: each using as sample
only the professors for whom δqits = 1, q = 1, . . . , 4, that is those in the same interval
of the type distribution in their respective scientific sector. The results of this exercise
are presented in the first two columns of Table 5. These OLS regressions are pooled,
because a panel estimation would lead to the academics who change interval from one
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period to the next to be dropped from the regression samples of both intervals: not
only almost one third of the observations would be lost, but the omitted academic are
likely to be those most responsive to the conditions in their environment. While the
results are consistent with the theoretical analysis and with the results in (7) and (8), in
the rest of the analysis, in order to make the most of the panel structure of the dataset,
we prefer to resort to a different technique to capture the potential non-linearities: this
is to interact the three variables of interest, xts, Kts, and Nts, with the ranking dummies
δ
q
its. We use this technique, in alternative to quantile regression, because the theoretical
analysis links a person’s effort to her position in the distribution within her scientific
sector (the function F appears in the equilibrium level of effort (1)). That is, what
matters is not her absolute “type”, but the position of her type in the distribution of
her competitors’ types. Thus for example two individuals in different scientific sectors
s and s′ may exert the same effort, and hence obtain the same output, and they would
be placed in the same quantile with a standard quantile regression. However, if one
is in the top decile of the types in her scientific sector (her δq10its = 1), and the other in
the sixth decile of hers (she has δq6its′ = 1), the theoretical analysis of Section 2 says that
these individuals would respond differently to, for example, the same increase in the
number of competitors: empirically, this would be reflected in α10KKts being different
from α6KKts in (9) below. To reflect these non-linearities, we therefore replace (3) with
oits = α0+ ∑
q∈Q
δ
q
its
(
αqxxts + αqKKts + αqN
(
Nts + λqRts
) )
+γCCts + fi + ξt +σs + ζu + εits.
(9)
The estimates of the coefficients αqR = αqNλq, therefore, represent the effect of the
reform on individuals’ response to changes in the competitive conditions.29 Equation
(9) is our main specification.
7 Results
Our main results are in Table 5. Our base specification is in the third and fourth
columns, which report the coefficients for the two regressions: assistant professors in-
tending to become associate, and associate professors intending to become full profes-
sors. These are obtained from the estimation of (9) with the natural log for the variables
K and N. Individual output is weighted with the number of co-authors. The clustering
of the standard errors is by scientific sector, the level of the main independent variables
29In the theoretical model we showed that R affects K as well as N. We have run all the regressions
with the interaction between K and R and the results are qualitatively unchanged. Including both
interactions determines collinearity between the four variables N, K, R× N, and R× K.
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and of the IV we use.30 We run two versions of the main regression, which differ in
Q, the partition of the academics in their scientific sector. Specifically, ordering the Nst
academics in scientific sector s in period t from the least to the most productive, Table 5
is built using the partition
Q =
{(
0,
Nst
2
]
,
(
Nst
2
,
7Nst
10
]
,
(
7Nst
10
,
9Nst
10
]
,
(
9Nst
10
, Nst
]}
, (10)
whereas we drew Figures 7-9 using the results of the regressions based on the partition
Q =
{(
(j− 1) Nst
10
,
jNst
10
]}
j=1,...,10
. (11)
Thus, for Table 5 we consider four unequally sized groups, those separated by the
median, the seventh, and ninth decile. Instead, for Figures 7-9 are obtained dividing
the academics in each scientific sector into ten identical intervals.31 The reason we
present the table with four groups is help the presentation by having fewer coefficients;
we chose unequal sizes for the groups, rather than quartiles, because, as predicted in
the theory section and indeed confirmed by Figures 7-9, the estimated coefficient are
very similar for the types below the median. Comparison of Table 5 and Figures 7-9
suggests that the loss of information in the table is limited.
In detail, Table 5 is organised as blocks of estimated coefficients, one block for each
of our variables of interest, (i) the importance of publications in WoK journals, the index
of orderliness x, (ii) the log of the number of posts available in the sector, (iii) the log of
the number of competitors, and (iv) the additional effect on the 1999 reform measured
via the reduction of the number of competitors. Within each block, the four coefficients
are the effect of a change in the variable on individuals in different position in the
ranking of their scientific sector. Thus the first coefficient is the effect on an academic’s
output of a change in the orderliness of scientific sector of an academic whose output
places her below the median in a given period. And so on for the other coefficients:
the second row is the value for individuals whose output is between the median and
the seventh decile, the third row for those between deciles seven and nine, and the last
row for the top academics, those with output above the ninth decile of the distribution
in their scientific sector, in the given period.
In Figures 7 and 9, the horizontal axis is the (inverse) rank of the academic’s type
30Table A7 in the appendix shows that the estimations gain little in significance when clustering is at
the individual professor rather than at the scientific sector level.
31Notice therefore that the results reported in Table 5 can be obtained from the regressions used to
draw Figures 7-9 with the additional restrictions α1z = α2z = α3z = α4z = α5z, α6z = α7z, and α8z = α9z.
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Figure 7:
Effect of a change in the index of orderliness.
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Note: Regression coefficients αqx in estimation (9), for a ten-interval partition of the type distribution.
The dashed lines include the 95% confidence intervals.
in her scientific sector, and the corresponding ordinate measures the effect of a change
in the exogenous variable on the output of the academics with that rank. The dashed
lines are the 95% confidence interval around the coefficient; we do not shown them in
Figure 8, to avoid clogging it. This figure shows, as dashed lines, the effect of N alone,
that is the effect for those academics for whom Rts = 0 for every t, the constraint is
not binding at any time, post-reform as well as pre-reform. The solid line is the sum
of the coefficients in the third and in the fourth blocks, for N and N × R, that is αqN
and αqR respectively, calculated when R is 2, its maximum possible value. The vertical
intercept of the solid line is therefore the effect of a change in the number of competitors
on the effort of an academic in a scientific sector where the post-reform constraint on
the number of applications is binding whenever she may apply for promotion.
For both sets of academics, an increase in orderliness increases effort for produc-
tive individuals, as predicted by Conjecture 1.(i), derived from the LHS panel of Fig-
ure 2, and reduces effort for less productive ones. An increase in competition, whether
achieved via a reduction in the number of posts, K, the second block of coefficients, or
via an increase in the number of potential applicants, N, the third block, increases effort
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of high types and reduces effort for high cost types, in line with Conjecture 1.(ii)-1.(iv).
One exception to this concordance with the theory given by the assistant professors
below the median, who appear to increase marginally their output. Notice also that the
differences in response between assistant and associate professors, such as the former
being more responsive to an increase in the importance of international publications as
selection criterion, may be explained by the fact that the extent of competition differs
in the two sectors, and as Figure 2 shows, relatively small changes in competition
may cause substantial changes in response. The position of the two curves and the
coefficients in the first row of Table 5 (the first two columns excepted) suggest an
effect not predicted by the theoretical model, a discouragement for the least productive
academics: they seem to respond to an increase in orderliness with a reduction in
their effort.32 Figure 8 also illustrates a result neatly in line with the prediction of the
theoretical model: productive (less productive) academics who are constrained in the
number of applications they can make respond to increases in the competitiveness of
their environment more weakly (more strongly) than their unconstrained colleagues,
as predicted by Conjecture 2.(i) (by Conjecture 2.(i)).
The main regression is in the third column, for assistant professors aiming to be-
come associate, and in the fourth, for associate professors aiming to become full profes-
sor. In the first two columns we report the results obtained by running the four separate
regressions for each set of academics, selecting the sample for each regression using the
value of the partition dummies δqits, for partition (10). While there are differences, the
main qualitative features are the same as in the third and fourth column.
To get a handle on the quantitative significance of our results, consider the main
regression in Table 5, third and fourth column. Suppose the index of orderliness for
promotion to associate of increased by one standard deviation in the average scientific
sector, from 0.6 to 0.73. This would determine an increase in output of 3%, 4.4%, and
9% for an assistant professor whose output is between the median and the seventh
decile, between the seventh and the ninth decile, and one whose output is in the top
10% among her peers, respectively. It would however reduce by 2.5% the output of
an assistant professor whose output is below the median. All these are percentages of
the average output of the full professors in the sector. Overall, there are 165 assistant
professors in the average sector, and so their aggregate output would increase by
32A natural modification of the theoretical model which could determine such discouragement is a
non-linear cost of effort: if increased effort along one dimension were to increase the marginal cost of
effort along other dimensions, then academics for whom effort is very costly, would reduce it in response
to a an increase in importance, in order to reduce the cost of effort along other dimensions.
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Figure 8:
Effect of a change in the number of competitors.
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Note: Regression coefficients αqN in estimation (9), for a ten-interval partition of the type distribution.
The confidence intervals are not drawn, to avoid cluttering the figure. As Table 5 indicates, the
coefficients are significant for the highest deciles.
(
0.09 × 0.1 + (0.044+ 0.03) × 0.2 − 0.025 × 0.5) × 165 = 0.98. This increase in the
importance of international publications would thus increase the number of papers
written by the assistant in the sector professors almost equal to the output of a full pro-
fessor. Similarly, and more specifically, suppose the number of posts for full professor
in economics were reduced by 1 (0.92%) in the third period: then similar calculations
would predict that this increase in competition would increase the number of papers
produced by the economics associate professors by
(
0.17× 0.1+(0.019− 0.012)× 0.2−
0.035 × 0.5) × 331 × 1.48 = 7.05 papers per year, as the average number of paper
written by full professors in the sector is 1.48.
In the next two columns of Table 5, the fourth and the sixth, we report the results of
the instrumental variable estimation, using the “homogeneity” of the full professors as
instruments for the orderliness index x. This homogeneity is proxied by the standard
deviation of the output of the full professors, and by their number relative to the
number of assistant and associate professors. Using only the former changes the result
only by a small amount, the signs and the order of magnitudes of the coefficients are
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very close. Comparison of the corresponding columns suggests that the qualitative
nature of the results is mostly unchanged relative to the OLS. Some coefficients do
change sign, in particular those determining the “competition” variables, K, and N.
Recall however we showed in the theoretical analysis (Section 2 and in particular
Figure 2) that these variables have been shown to have potentially different effects
according to the values of the other parameters. On the other hand, the effect of the
orderliness and the effect of the reform on effort, which are unambiguously signed in
the theoretical analysis, are qualitatively similar in columns 3 and 5 and in columns 4
and 6 of Table 5, as the first and the last blocks of coefficients show. The results of the
first stage regression are reported in Table A8 of the online appendix.
In the rest of Table 5 we report some robustness checks; these confirm that the
main results change little with the details of the econometric specification chosen, and
suggest some interesting considerations. The seventh and eighth columns in the table
show the coefficient when the output is measured as the number of papers published
in WoK weighted by the position of the journal in the impact factor ordering of journals
for that research area according to the impact factor.33 The coefficients are qualitatively
very similar to those reported in the first two columns. Together with the high correla-
tion between these measures of output and other plausible ones with different weights
for authors and importance of the outlet, these two columns suggest that our results
are robust to changes to the way output is measured.
Appointment committees are free to choose the criteria to apply in choosing whom
to appoint. We have so far postulated that candidates, when assessing the order-
liness of past decision making of these committees, assume that they have ranked
the candidates according to the output of those candidates in the period where the
appointments take place: that is, they base their decisions on the candidates recent
record. On the other hand, the candidates might instead believe that the committees
choose to rank individuals according to their entire careers. In this case the position of
a candidate might be different, and given that the position of a candidate in the ranking
of their scientific sector determines their effort, so would potentially be the effort. In
the ninth and tenth column of Table 5, we therefore report the coefficients estimated
when an academic’s ranking in their scientific sector is determined by their lifetime
achievement, that is taking into account both all the past publications and also the
influence of these publications, determined by the real h-index we have used above.
These regressions are similar to our base regression, reported in the third and fourth
33Correspondingly, the cumulative output used to compute the orderliness index is also computed
weighting with the impact factor.
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Figure 9:
Effect of a change in the number of posts.
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Note: Regression coefficients αqx in estimation (9), multplied by −1, for a ten-interval partition of the
type distribution. The dashed lines include the 95% confidence intervals.
column. There are some differences in the coefficients for the parameters measuring
competition, K and N, but those for the effect of the reform and the importance of
publication do not vary qualitatively, with one important exception. Individuals in the
top decile do not appear to increase their effort. This tallies somehow with Figure 1
and the LHS panel of 2, which shows that the response to a change in orderliness
tends to become constant for the most productive academics, and therefore lower as
a proportion of output. Intuitively, we can think of an academic who, having hit a
good number of prestigious outlets in the past, needs little additional effort to gain
promotion. This effect is more pronounced when competition is relaxed (the thinner
lines in the figure), and arguably, in a world were past career is taken into account,
competition is more relaxed as the impact of a new paper on the total is more limited
than when past successes lose their shine after a few short years.
The individual fixed effects we estimate offer an interesting confirmation of the
soundness of our approach. These fixed effects, which are functions of individuals’
types vi, measure differences in the effort exerted by different individuals who find
themselves in identical conditions. Conceptually they capture the “underlying pro-
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Figure 10:
Individual Fixed Effects for two Promotions.
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Note: The plots show the individual fixed effect for promotion to associate professor (the third column of
Table 5) and the individual fixed effect for promotion to full professor (the fourth column) for academics
who have been promoted twice in the 21 year period. A handful of outliers have fixed effects estimated
higher than 10, which are off the scale of the two axes.
ductivity” in normal conditions, and are determined by talents, skills, personality and
attitude towards research, which are both unobservable and in principle roughly con-
stant throughout a person’s professional life, and should therefore exhibit a degree
of serial correlation, though perhaps not perfect, as life events, personal and profes-
sional alike, may modify these traits to some extent. 19, 046 individuals, 23% of the
total (among them one of the authors) appear in both our dataset, first as assistant
professors competing to become associate, then as associate professors. For them, we
can therefore estimate two separate fixed effects, which are obtained from completely
separate datasets: the parameters are different, and the output of a period appears in
both regressions only when a person is promoted twice in the same period. Figure 10
plots the fixed effect derived from the regression that estimates effort exerted when
competing to become full professor against that exerted, earlier in one’s career, to
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become associate professor. The visual impression of a good association among these
two sets of fixed effects is confirmed by the high value, 0.63, of the correlation between
them. Note that there appear to be no qualitative differences between broad research
areas. The concentration of the fixed effects pairs on the positive quadrant is a natural
consequence of the sample selection, given that those who appear in both regression
have been twice successful in their applications for promotion, and have all reached
the highest academic rank. We find their stability across time as a further confirmation
of the correspondence between our theoretical set-up and our empirical specification.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the response of Italian academics to changes in competitive condi-
tions. We study the period from 1990 to 2011. Like in many other countries, appoint-
ments and promotions were determined by peer assessed academic quality, but the
legislation which governed them, striving to reduce the scope of unethical behaviour
by the decision makers, introduced many explicit and detailed rules. These can be
mapped into a theoretical set-up which allows a precise quantification of the changes
in an individual academic’s incentives determined by changes in the competitive con-
ditions of her research area. The model predicts differential responses to competitive
conditions for individuals with different characteristics; specifically, the change in ef-
fort level in response to exogenous changes differ according to individuals’ position in
the publication’s ranking of her discipline. If the competitive conditions change, for
example because more jobs become available, then productive individuals, for whom
exerting effort is “cheap”, who were therefore exerting a good deal of effort, were
already highly likely to be promoted, and so have relatively little incentive to exert
“extra” effort. But for someone in the middle of the ranking, the laxer competitive
conditions, for example the availability of an additional post, might mean that effort
becomes more productive, in the sense that “extra” effort might be rewarded with a
relatively large increase in the probability of winning the additional job made available.
Following our theoretical analysis, we include these non-linearities in our econo-
metric strategy, applied to the dataset we have built, which collects the publications in
international scientific journals written by academics working in Italian universities.
This strategy is made possible by the insular nature of Italian academia, where entry
tends to happen at the lowest level, and early exit is very rare. We find that the
model predicts well both the general lines and also the details of the theoretical model,
regarding the different response to changes in the exogenous conditions by different
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types of individuals. Thus our analysis suggests that the contest model described by
the multiple-unit all-pay auction does capture the utility function of academics, even
where, like in the period we study in Italy, the incentives they operate under are rather
weak.
We exploit, in testing the model, an important detail of the reform of the university
system which took place in 1999, the introduction of an upper limit to the number
of applications for promotions an individual professor could make in each calendar
year. Intended to reduce the burden on members of the promotions panels, this had
the additional and unintended consequence of relaxing the competitive condition for
some, but not all the academics. The correspondence between the theoretical model
and the behaviour of the Italian academics we study is confirmed by the empirical
analysis, which shows that the most productive academics increased their effort less
than those unaffected by the rule, whereas all the less productive ones increased it, just
as predicted by the theory. To the extent that the multi-unit all-pay auction model is
a good fit of the behaviour of academics, a broad policy indication suggested by our
analysis would therefore be that strengthening incentives, for example by rewarding
success more explicitly, might generate the expected responses in the direction of in-
creased effort and output by Italian researchers. This paper does not try to determine
the overall effect of the reform. This effect is in principle hard to disentangle from any
time trend in the work patterns of academics, and is shown to be limited in Battistin et
al (2014). It instead uses the way in which details of the reform result in a possibly
counterintuitive theoretical effect, which is matched in the empirical analysis. The
complexity of the response, proved at a theoretical level and confirmed in the empirical
application, hints at an important policy contribution from our paper is to highlight the
importance fully to understand the incentives put in play by complex rules in order to
anticipate possible unintended consequence on individual behaviour created by new
legislation, lest they cause unexpected and undesired outcomes.
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Online Appendix (not for publication)
A Proof of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the probability of winning, (2), the expected payoff of can-
didate of type vi who chooses effort levels bi is:
EΠi = xZKN (V (bi))− bivi .
Differentiate the above with respect to bi to get:
∂EΠi
∂bi
= xZ′KN (V (bi))V
′ (bi)− 1vi = 0. (A1)
Because the strategy profile is symmetric, all players use the same strategies, and
V(bi) = vi (Barut et al 2002, p 680). Therefore (A1), can be written as:
xV (bi) Z′KN (V (bi)) =
1
V′ (bi)
. (A2)
The first order conditions are sufficient, given that d
2Epii
db2i
< 0, which follows immedi-
ately from Barut et al (2002, Appendix, pp 706-707).
Recall that B (vi) is the inverse of V (bi), and the above can be written as
B′ (vi) = xviZ′KN (vi) , B (v) = 0, (A3)
which has solution given by (1), and this establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose a candidate has applied for K̂ positions, each with N̂
applicants. If all the appointments are made according to research output then, from
the point of view of an individual candidate, the situation is as it would be if there were
a single competition with K̂ posts and N̂ competitors: she disregards the competition
she has not entered. Thus if all the appointments are made according to research
output, her payoff is
ZK̂N̂ (V (bi)) .
This happens with probability xK̂. If instead only K̂− 1 of the appointments are made
A1
according to research output the payoff is
ZK̂−1,N̂−1 (V (bi)) ,
as one of the competitors wins the competition which disregards publications and
is “withdrawn” from the pool, together with that competition. This happens with
probability (K̂1)x
K̂−1 (1− x). Of course, she can win that competition as well, but the
probability of this happening is independent of bi. And so on for all possible combi-
nations of publications mattering/not mattering for the K appointments. Adding up
over all the possible criteria gives the first term in (A4) below. From this, we subtract
the cost of effort.
K̂−1
∑
k=0
(
K̂
k
)
xK̂−k (1− x)k ZK̂−k,N̂−k (V (bi))−
bi
vi
. (A4)
Differentiation of (A4) gives the first order conditions which correspond to (A1):
K̂−1
∑
k=0
(
K̂
k
)
xK̂−k (1− x)k Z′K̂−k,N̂−k (V (bi))V′ (bi)−
1
V (bi)
= 0. (A5)
The expression corresponding to (A2) in Proposition 1 is now derived for for this case:
V (bi)
∑K̂−1k=0 (
K̂
k)x
K̂−k (1− x)k Z′
Kˆ−k,N̂−k (V (bi))
∑K̂−1k=0 (
K̂
k) (1− x)K̂−k xk
=
1
V′ (bi)
,
and the result follows.
B Institutional details
The Italian university sector in the period we consider experienced fairly significant
changes, as it went from a fully centralised system under direct control by the govern-
ment, to a degree of autonomy for individual universities. This process was gradual
and begun with Law n. 168, approved formally in 1989, which however was imple-
mented slowly and in a piecemeal fashion and became fully operative more than a
decade later. Before this law, universities were part of the state bureaucracy, degrees
programmes were identical across the country and university professors were civil
servants. With the new law, a block grant was awarded to each university and they
were allowed some discretion in setting tuition fees (starting in 1993), a degree of
teaching autonomy (1997), and permitted to introduce post-graduate degrees (in 1999,
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in accordance with Europe’s “Bologna” process).
Like in many countries, US and UK among others, each university was organised
in faculties, and faculties in turn in institutes, laboratories, and departments. Roughly
speaking, teaching was done by faculties and research by the institutes, labs, and
departments. The appurtenance of an academic to a faculty was formalised in the
paperwork, while other links were less formal. There were three ranks for academics:
assistant, associate, and full professor. Each academic had to be registered as member
of one and only one of the 371 scientific sectors created at central level; there was no
requirement that all members of a faculty or of a department had to belong to the same
scientific sector, and it was not uncommon for a professor in a scientific sector to be in
a faculty not closely related to his/her research interests.1
Even though in the 1990s universities were given some managerial and financial
autonomy, university professors maintained their status of public employees: pay
scales2 and career progress were uniform across the country, mechanically determined
on the basis of seniority and age, and no merit pay was possible. Academics had to be
hired through public “competitions”, with rigid and uniform rules.
Positions for assistant professor, while authorised centrally before financial au-
tonomy, were filled with a local interview process which would have been recognis-
able to US and UK academics. This however, had to be preceded by two unseen
written examinations. The procedure for new posts for full and associate professors
were instead radically different. All posts which the government decided to fund in
a pluriennial planning cycle were advertised simultaneously in all subject areas for all
universities. These calls were meant to happen every two years, though in practice
they were delayed, as a cost-cutting measure, and happened at four yearly intervals,
as illustrated by Table 2 in the text. Formally, anybody could apply, not even a degree
was necessary, though in practice potential applicants were academics in the lower
rank in the same scientific sector, plus some from similar scientific sectors, and people
from outside the Italian university system. Schematically, the procedure was for each
university to submit requests for a number of posts in each of the 371 scientific sectors,
with their proposed internal allocation to faculties, and for the ministry to accede to
some of these requests. Selection committees were formed using a combination of
1This was somewhat inevitable due to the fairly broad nature of the teaching, so that, for example,
economics graduates, had, by law, to pass several exams in law, accounting, management, foreign
languages, medical students had to study physics and law, engineering students mathematics and
management, and so on.
2The salary scales were (and are) overlapping: the lower rungs of the full professor scale being well
below the upper rungs of the associate professor’s scale, although promotions maintained length of
service so that did not imply a pay-cut.
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elections by peers and random draws.3 Selection committees had much discretion in
establishing criteria for promotion, in the spirit of the self-regulating academia, includ-
ing the relative importance of outputs and activities such as teaching and contribution
to the wider society. Committees, however, had to agree on these criteria and make
them public after their first meeting. Though not explicitly required in the rules, in
practice the number of “winners” was equal to the number of posts advertised.
Once appointed, academics were allocated to the faculties that had opened the
positions. Following a probation period lasting three years, tenure was granted by a
national committee, who very occasionally required a further review, two years hence.
It could terminate employment, though this was a rare event indeed. Once tenured,
a professor gained full freedom of movement across departments within the same
university, while movement across universities was limited by availability of financial
resources in the destination university. On the other hand, changes of the scientific
sector of appurtenance required the approval of a national committee (CUN-Consiglio
Universitario Nazionale, a consulting body for the Ministry, elected nationally by all
professors).
In the year 1999, following the increase in the financial autonomy of universities,
they took over the responsibility of hiring and competitions became “local”. Each
department competed with the other departments in the university to obtain funding
to fill positions. The vacancy opened, a committee was formed, again with a high de-
gree of centralisation: members of the appointing department were always a minority.
Even though there was only one post available, the committee could grant eligibility
(“idoneita`”) to up to three applicants (subsequently reduced to two), among whom the
department chose the preferred candidate. The other eligible candidates could be hired
by other universities without embarking into the formal appointment procedure (for
a more detailed description see Moss 2012). In order to avoid the risk of inflating the
number of applications to each opening, the law introduced a cap of five to the number
of potential applications that each academic could submit each year.
At the end of 2010, another major reform (Law n. 240) granted university more bud-
3Committees were composed of an odd number of members (five, seven, or nine, depending on
the expected number of applications). In the case of competitions for associate professorships, the
committee for each scientific sector comprised two, three, or four associate professors and three, four, or
five full professors, all belonging to that scientific sector. In the competition for full professorships, all
members had to be full professors. The selection of members differed slightly in the two ranks: all full
professors in a scientific sector elected triple the number of required members, and then the Ministry
randomly drew the committee. The opposite order was followed to form the appointment committees
for associate professorships: first the Ministry drew triple the number of required members, and then
full and associated professors elected their respective representatives in the selecting committee.
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getary autonomy, and relaxed marginally the Ministry’s control over degree courses
and other teaching matters. From the personnel viewpoint, the main change was the
explicitly introduction of internal promotions, conditional on obtaining a qualification
in national competitions. Prior to it, during the period we study, the Italian system did
not have “internal” promotions. Someone who had been in post as associate professor
in a university had to wait for a full professor post to be advertised, and then apply like
everyone else to the national competition. Universities simply did not have the legal
authority to sanction a change of rank. This law also changed the position of assistant
professor. This was tenured until 2010, and it was replaced by temporary three year
contracts (so called type A post) and tenure-track contracts (type B) of the “up-or-out”
variety.
The contractual obligation for associate and full professors requires 350 hours per
year being devoted to teaching and administrative duties (250 hours for part-time pro-
fessors), but nothing was formally expected regarding research activity. New reforms
which begun in the 2010s introduced some evaluation of departmental research (the
VQR), but in the period we study, the only incentive to conduct good research and to
obtain highly visible publications derives from career aspirations.
C Construction of the dataset
We present here some additional details of the preparation of the dataset.
C.1 Regression sample
We run two regressions, one for assistant professors (ricercatori) one for associate pro-
fessors. In each regression, we include an academic/period observation if in that pe-
riod the academic can be promoted to the next rank in the hierarchy, or if the academic
is in the rank for the first time, and were in a lower rank in the previous period. Clearly,
the individual fixed effect can be calculated only for those academics who appear in a
given regression in at least two periods.
Table A1 illustrates eight plausible cases, with fictitious names. The first five columns
show in which periods the academic appear in the dataset, then when he or she is
included in the two regression, and whether their fixed effect is calculated.
With these criteria for inclusion in the regression sample, the number of observa-
tions the base and most other regressions is 120,095 and 90,894 for the assistant and
associate regressions, with 47,572 and 37,066 different academics, respectively.
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Table A1:
Inclusion in the Regression according to rank in each period.
Period Regression Regression
Name P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Assoc FE? Full FE?
Frodo Baggins Ric AP Full Full Full P1-P2 Yes P2-P3 Yes
Saruman Ric Ric Ric Ric AP P1-P5 Yes - -
Arwen AP AP Full Full - - - P1-P3 Yes
Gollum - - - - AP - - P5 No
Grı´ma Wormtongue Ric Ric AP AP Full P1-P3 Yes P3-P5 Yes
Galadriel Ric Full Full Full Full P1-P2 Yes - -
Bilbo Baggins - - Ric Ric Ric P3-P5 Yes - -
Sauron Full Full Full Full - - - - -
Note: Eight fictitious academics, and their inclusion in our two regressions, according to their rank:
Assistant Professor (Ric), Associate Professor (AP) or Full Professor (Full) in the last year of each of the
five periods.
C.2 Size of Scientific Sectors
Figure A1 depicts the distribution of the scientific sectors by size, pooling the years
together. Size is measured as the average number of full professors in a year in a
given scientific sector. The largest size is reached by “Economics” (the sector labelled
SECS/P01) in 2007, with 341 full professors. See footnote 7 for information on the size
of other subdisciplines related to economics.
C.3 Pre-1994 Scientific Sectors
The scientific sector to which each professor was allocated was not recorded prior to
1994: we therefore “back-fill” by assigning the earliest recorded scientific sector to a
person’s missing values of the preceding years. In addition, a reclassification of the
codes took place in 2000: we have mapped the old codes into the new ones following
the relevant pieces of legislation: Decreto Ministeriale 23 December 1999, available, in
Italian, at www.miur.it/UserFiles/116.htm and http://attiministeriali.
miur.it/media/174798/allegato%20a_def.pdf.
C.4 Early exit from the database
Figure A2, which depicts the age distribution of exits from the system for associate
and assistant professors as the solid lines, strongly suggests that exit from the dataset
is determined by attrition, deaths and other exogenous events: reaching normal retire-
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Figure A1:
Distribution of the number of full professors in scientific sectors.
Note: Kernel density of the number of full professors in period times scientific sectors.
ment age is the norm. Regular exits from the system due to outside work opportunities
would probably exhibit a different age pattern, as younger academics would be more
likely to take such opportunities, and perhaps also differ for men and women. That
only 0.1% of assistant and associate professors born between 1950 and 1960 leave the
system before the age of 50, an age beyond which people are unlikely to emigrate or
leave the university career, suggests that the incentives created by work opportunities
outside the system are at best marginal. It therefore seems likely that career prospect
outside Italian academia, for example in more rewarding academic positions abroad,
were not a source of motivation for the individuals in our dataset.
C.5 Disambiguation of homonymy
In this section we explain how we have attempted to reduce the misattribution of
papers to academics who share the surname and the initial with someone who works
at an institution associated with the same university where they work. We begin by
aggregating the scientific sectors into 29 groups (using the alphabetic part of the codes
for the scientific sectors themselves). We then use the allocation of journals to 260
“subdisciplines” by the Journal Citation Report to calculate the frequency with which
professors from each of the 29 research areas publish in journals assigned to these
subdisciplines, and the frequency with which papers published in a subdisciplines
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Figure A2:
Age distribution of leavers
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Note: Kernel density of the age at which Italian academics leave the university sector in the
sample period. The normal legal retirement age for university professors (and a few other
public sector posts) was 60 for female and 70 for male associate and assistant professors and 70
for female and 75 for male full professors; this could be extended in some special cases.
are by professors in each research area. We then allocate an article that prima facie
appears to have been written by a given Italian professor to that professor if either
of these frequencies exceeds a certain value. The value itself is different for different
research areas and different subdisciplines. In other words, if professors from a certain
research areas appear to publish only occasionally in journals in a certain discipline,
and if publications in journals from that subdiscipline are written only occasionally by
professors in that research areas, then we attribute all such publications to homonymy,
and do not allocate them to professors in the given research areas.
Formally, consider a paper published by author Y who is classified in the Ministry
database as pertaining to research area B and who has published in a journal assigned
by the Journal Citation Report to subdiscipline X. We attribute this paper to professor
Y if the share of papers written by professors in research area B published in subdis-
cipline X (the share of the total of papers published by professors in research area B),
exceeds a proportion of the Herfindal index (taken as a measure of the concentration
of subdisciplines where professors in research area B publish) or if the share of papers
written by professors in research area B published in subdiscipline X (the share of the
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total of papers published by in subdiscipline X), exceeds a proportion of the Herfindal
index (taken as a measure of the concentration of professors’ publications in research
areas who publish in journals in subdiscipline X). We adjust for concentration – using
the Herfindal index – because certain research area tend to publish almost exclusively
in certain journals, and vice versa, certain journal subdisciplines tend to attract almost
exclusively professor from certain research areas. When homonyms are also in the
same disciplinary area, we share arbitrarily the papers among them. For example, if
Enzo and Emilia Ferrari both held posts in Law in 1997 at the University of Modena,
each of the downloaded papers authored by E Ferrari would be attributed to Enzo with
probability 12 .
C.6 Recovering the h-index
For all its limitations, the h-index is gaining acceptance as a measure of a person’s
influence with their academic colleagues. To construct the h-index we need the number
of papers and the citations each paper has received. The information we downloaded
from WoK contains only the total number of citations at the time of download, and,
in order to avoid downloading all the papers that cite a given paper and allocate each
citation to the year in which the paper was cited, we assume that all papers in a given
sub-discipline have the same time pattern of citations, and attributed the accumulated
number of citations to each of the years since the paper’s publication according to that
pattern.4
Rather than the h-index, we calculate the real h-index (Guns and Rousseau (2009, p
67, expression (6)), which has the twofold advantage of taking continuously distributed
values, and of refining the ordering of different individuals. For example, if individuals
A’s publications have 10, 1, and 0 citations, individuals B’s publications have 1, 1, and
0 citations, both would have an h-index of 1, but individuals A has a real h-index of
1.9, whereas individuals B’s real h-index is 1. This reduces considerably the number of
ties in a way consistent with the importance of a person’s output.
C.7 Orderliness x in different scientific sectors
Are there differences between research areas? This question is inspired by two recent
assessment exercises carried out in the Italian university system, one assessing the
research activities of every Italian university department, and the other determining
4Thus, for example, if all the papers in physics have received 13 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
6 of citations in the first four
years after publications, and none in the successive years, then we have assumed that a paper published
in 2002 which had 12 citations at the time of download had received 4 citations in 2002, 3 in 2003, 3 in
2004, and 2 in 2005, and none subsequently.
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Table A2:
Descriptive statistics of the index of orderliness.
Period
Non-Bibliometric Bibliometric T-test
mean st.dev n mean st.dev n p-value
1990-1994 0.017 (0.179) 144 0.047 (0.258) 190 0.88
1995-1998 0.093 (0.232) 128 0.314 (0.338) 172 1.00
1999-2002 0.045 (0.165) 159 0.363 (0.222) 192 1.00
2003-2006 0.041 (0.147) 154 0.339 (0.254) 195 1.00
2007-2011 0.086 (0.226) 136 0.302 (0.360) 190 1.00
1990-2011 0.055 (0.192) 721 0.273 (0.311) 939 1.00
Note: Orderliness of appointments and promotions to associate professor of bibliometric and non-
bibliometric scientific sectors in Italian universities. Mean, standard deviation and number of scientific
subsectors where at least one promotion occurred in a period. The the last column reports the p-values
of mean difference tests between non-bibliometric and bibliometric scientific sectors.
which Italian assistant and associate professors were qualified for promotion. In these
exercises, each of the scientific sectors was classified as either “bibliometric” or “non
bibliometric”,5 with different assessment rules for the two types: assessment in the
bibliometric scientific sectors had to utilise explicitly quantitative measures of publi-
cations in journals indexed in the Web of Knowledge and Scopus databases, while the
non bibliometric relied exclusively on peer review. As far as we are aware, however,
whether a given scientific sector was bibliometric or non bibliometric was decided by
the government agency subjectively rather than following some objective algorithm.
It might therefore be of interest to know whether the ministerial classification reflects
differences in the criteria used in the past by promotion and appointment panels in the
different scientific sectors. We do so here using the index of orderliness (5).
Table A2 reports the mean by scientific sector, split between bibliometric and non-
bibliometric scientific sectors. As Table A2 shows, there are substantially differences
in the role of ranking as determined by publication in international journals, which
play on average a greater role in scientific sectors classified as bibliometric by the
government. The same message is conveyed by Figure 3, which gives the kernel
density of the orderliness computed for each scientific sector within each broad re-
search area, and shows that on average the bibliometric/non-bibliometric divide is
valid. Note that there is substantial variation within research areas to cast doubts on the
5The Ministry groups these 371 scientific sectors into broad research areas, and classifies Mathe-
matics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Medicine, Engineering, Psychology, Agriculture and Veterinary
Sciences as “bibliometric”, and Humanities, Law, Sociology, Political Sciences, Architecture, History,
Philosophy, Economics and Statistics as “non-bibliometric”.
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overall validity of the classification for a substantial minority of the scientific sectors:
within each broad research area some sectors are more bibliometric than others, and
their differences, as suggested by the P-values in Table A2 do not justify the sharp
difference in assessment methodology. Finally, note that while the area of “Economics,
Management and Statistics” is classified by the government as “non-bibliometric”, the
orderliness of its scientific sectors generates a kernel density, drawn in Figure 3 as the
thicker dashed line, which is similar to the corresponding curves for the bibliometric
broad research areas.
D Disaggregated analysis by broad research area.
We report more disagregated descriptive statistics and further empirical results which
might be of interest to some readers.
The 371 scientific sectors can be grouped into five “broad research areas”, Science,
Medicine, Engineering, Art Humanities and Law, and Social Science. Tables A3 and
A4 break down the information in Tables 1 and 2 by period and by broad subject
area. Similarly, Table A5 gives the breakdown of the summary statistics, presented
in aggregate in Table 3, by broad research area. This information is further broken
down by period for the index of orderliness in the second part of Table A5.
In Table A6 we split the sample by broad research area. The main results reported
in Table 5 hold in each subsample, indicating limited differences across broad research
areas. Statistical significance declines, especially in the Arts, Humanities and Law, and
in the social sciences. This is not surprising due to the lower importance of publishing
in WoK outlets for academics in those disciplines.
E Further results
Table A7 reports the results of further robustness tests in respect of the clustering of
the standard errors, of the temporal structure of academics’ decision making, and of
the computation of the expected number of potential competitors, N.
E.1 Clustering of the standard errors.
Recall that in the main table in the text, Table 5, we clustered the standard errors at
the level of the variation in the main RHS variables, and of the instrument in the IV
estimation, namely the scientific sector. As some individual changed scientific sector,
we dropped them from the regression, given that there might be something different
about them.
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In the first three pairs of columns in Table A7, we report the comparison between
the main regression (the first two columns in Table 5), which we report in columns 3
and 4 in Table A7, and two regressions where the clustering is at individual professor
level, rather than at scientific sector level. In columns 5 and 6, we use the same sample
as in the main regression: coefficients and the number of observations are obviously
identical, and there is a small reduction in the standard errors. In columns 1 and 2
in Table A7, we report the regression with the entire sample, that is including the
individuals who have changed scientific sector before or at promotions. When we
cluster at individual level, the coefficients are essentially unchanged, suggesting that
the small number of individuals dropped has no effect on the estimates.
E.2 Different time scale
The time structure implied by (9) assumes that effort in period t is determined by the
period t variables. This could be either because academics apply for posts during the
period, when they know the conditions which prevail in their sector, or, if they plan
to apply in the next period, because they have static expectations and believe that the
current conditions will prevail in the future as well. One could instead hypothesize
longer lags between effort and applications, and forward looking individuals, who
assume that they will apply for posts in the next period, and hold rational expectations
regarding the future values of the variables, so that their period t output is affected by
the expected values of x, K, and N in the next period. In this case (9) is replaced by:
oits = α0 + ∑
q∈Q
δ
q
its
(
αqxxt+1,s + αqKKt+1,s + αqN
(
Nt+1,s + λqRt+1,s
) )
+γCCts + fi + ξt + σs + ζu + εits. (A6)
We reports the estimations of (A6) in the seventh and eighth columns in Table A7,
with this assumption that individuals base their choice of effort on the conditions
expected for the next period. The coefficients for x are similar, those for K, N, and
for the interaction of N and R less so, suggesting that academics were relatively more
able to anticipate the future values of the importance of refereed publications than the
number of competitors or posts in future periods. It also suggest that the introduction
of the cap on the number of applications was not anticipated. Alternatively, it might be
that academics respond to current conditions and that the similarity of the value of x in
the first two columns, and in the fifth and sixth is simply due to the fact that x changes
little from one period to the next.
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E.3 Randomness of the post-reform constraint.
To confirm further the quasi-experimental nature of the tightness of the constraint,
in this subsection we show that there before the reform was no systematic difference
in the trend of output in sectors in which after the reform the constraint turns out to
be binding. We run two very simple regressions of ∆s, the proportional difference in
average productivity in sector s, s = 1, . . . , 371, between the two pre-reform periods on
Rs the average tightness of the reform in the third and fourth period (we exclude period
5, because the constraint was slack for most sectors). That is, we run the regression:
∆s = α+ βRs + ξs, (A7)
where
∆s =
os2 − os1
os1
, (A8)
Rs =
Rs3 + Rs4
2
, (A9)
where in turn ost is the average output in sector s in period t, and Rst is the tightness of
the constraint in sector s in period t. From this we obtain:
∆s = 0.386
0.105
∗∗∗ − 0.295
0.439
Rs + ξs,
∆s = 0.207
0.084
∗∗∗ − 0.179
0.369
Rs + ξs,.
The first regression is for the assistant professors sample the second for the associate
professors. The lack of statistical significance, and a value of R2 = 0.001 in both cases
indicate the absence of correlation between the tightness of the post-reform constraint
on application and the pre-reform productivity trends.
We have also replaced Rs with Rs, a dummy taking value 1 if and only if Rs is above
the median (other plausible threshold give similar result), and obtained the following
∆s = 0.439
0.123
∗∗∗ − 0.171
0.163
Rs + ξs,
∆s = 0.122
0.098
∗∗∗ + 0.103
0.130
Rs + ξs,.
Here again the lack of statistical significance indicates the average similarity of the
pre-reform trends of treated and untreated scientific sectors, the treated ones being
those where the constraint on application was tight after the reform. The R2 is 0.004
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and 0.002, respectively.
E.4 The evolution of the variables.
Th aim of this subsection is to confirm that the temporal pattern of the three main
variables x, K, and N is indeed the one that would be expected in a stable environment,
where the government, while conscious of the overall funding total is not striving to
micromanage the allocation to scientific sectors. To this aim, we construct the trend, by
period, of the three variables in the two sample (the log for K and N). As it would be
cumbersome to present all 371 of them, we choose those for the scientific sectors which
fall at the nine interior deciles (that is, the 10-th, 20th, 30-th and so on percentiles)
according to the ranking determined by that variable in the first period. This is in
Figure A3. We also plot the scatter of the mean and standard deviation (both calculated
over the five periods observed) of these same variables for all the 371 scientific sectors
(Figure A4). The lack of any discernible pattern in either set of diagrams can be taken
as an indication that funding was determined by the natural turnover and changes in
overall patterns of student numbers rather than anything more related to the charac-
teristics of the sector, such as size or the importance of the measurable dimension.
F Fixed effects
The value of the fixed effect for each Italian university, excluding the smaller specialist
ones is shown in Table A9 for the two regressions. This could be taken as a measure of
an independent effect on a person’s output due to the fact of being employed by a given
institution. Most effects are not significantly different from 0, which, as mentioned in
the text, is what one would expect given that incentives operate at national level.
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Table A3:
Promotions and Appointments by Period and Broad Research Area
Disciplinary Area
from Assist. from Assoc. from Assist from Outside from Outside
to Assoc. to Full to Full to Assoc. to Full
Science
1990-1994 869 610 29 304 51
1995-1998 752 30 1 145 12
1999-2002 2,094 1,829 33 242 64
2003-2006 1,354 900 6 164 24
2007-2011 607 349 7 78 15
Medicine
1990-1994 404 204 13 246 17
1995-1998 108 124 21 82 20
1999-2002 889 828 48 460 47
2003-2006 687 525 4 321 30
2007-2011 301 256 2 93 13
Engineering
1990-1994 444 265 4 149 9
1995-1998 693 21 5 82 3
1999-2002 1,033 1,100 12 88 9
2003-2006 811 554 3 118 13
2007-2011 406 201 4 38 9
Arts, Hum. & Law
1990-1994 546 392 34 226 28
1995-1998 537 82 16 137 18
1999-2002 2,099 1,918 93 549 62
2003-2006 1,383 1,140 33 449 36
2007-2011 615 449 7 127 25
Social Sciences
1990-1994 276 147 3 106 10
1995-1998 351 44 3 46 8
1999-2002 949 787 12 136 21
2003-2006 644 520 4 128 19
2007-2011 323 193 2 61 20
Total 19,175 13,468 399 4,575 583
Note: Breaking down of Table 2 by broad research area. See the note of Table 2 for details.
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Figure A3:
Time trend of the main independent variables.
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sample.
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Figure A4:
Mean and standard deviation of the main independent variables.
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Table A8:
First stage regressions: Interaction of index x with partition.
Assistant professors Associate professors
Below
median
Deciles
6 and 7
Deciles
8 and 9
Top
decile
Below
median
Deciles
6 and 7
Deciles
8 and 9
Top
decile
Interaction of sd
Below median 0.00831*** -0.00855*** -0.00991*** -0.00506*** 0.0313*** -0.00473*** -0.00509*** -0.00218***
(0.000695) (0.000466) (0.000452) (0.000304) (0.00805) (0.00160) (0.00146) (0.000634)
Deciles 6 and 7 -0.0250*** 0.0234*** -0.00916*** -0.00479*** -0.0109** 0.0363*** -0.00485*** -0.00190**
(0.000827) (0.000554) (0.000538) (0.000361) (0.00505) (0.00614) (0.00178) (0.000798)
Deciles 8 and 9 -0.0272*** -0.00853*** 0.0250*** -0.00423*** -0.0131*** -0.00501*** 0.0380*** -0.00134
(0.000846) (0.000567) (0.000550) (0.000370) (0.00494) (0.00172) (0.00623) (0.00106)
Top Decile -0.0276*** -0.00907*** -0.00842*** 0.0312*** -0.0144*** -0.00576*** -0.00177 0.0423***
(0.00109) (0.000731) (0.000710) (0.000477) (0.00471) (0.00168) (0.00217) (0.00629)
Interaction of ratio
Below median 0.0371*** 0.0134*** 0.0104*** 0.00378*** 0.0329 -0.000536 -0.00348 -0.00299
(0.00211) (0.00141) (0.00137) (0.000922) (0.0237) (0.00697) (0.00669) (0.00338)
Deciles 6 and 7 0.0309*** 0.0158*** 0.0128*** 0.00453*** 0.00782 0.0288 -0.00322 -0.00203
(0.00257) (0.00172) (0.00167) (0.00112) (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.00771) (0.00345)
Deciles 8 and 9 0.0282*** 0.0136*** 0.0115*** 0.00612*** 0.00887 0.00147 0.0202 -0.00226
(0.00262) (0.00176) (0.00171) (0.00115) (0.0177) (0.00718) (0.0177) (0.00457)
Top decile 0.0265*** 0.0107*** 0.0176*** 0.00281* 0.00326 -0.00208 0.000415 0.0229
(0.00356) (0.00238) (0.00231) (0.00155) (0.0161) (0.00729) (0.00742) (0.0176)
Observations 109,142 109,142 109,142 109,142 83,766 83,766 83,766 83,766
F-test 401.10*** 303.2*** 338.3*** 203.6*** 398.6*** 250.8*** 267.77*** 128.53***
Number of professors 36,619 36,619 36,619 36,619 29,938 29,938 29,938 29,938
Note: First stage regression results (intrumental variables only), for the regression in column 3 and 4
in Table 5. See the note in that table for details of the independent variables. The instruments are
the standard deviation of the output of the full professors, and the ratio of the numbers of full and
associate/assistant professors in the scientific sector in the period. See Section 5 in the main text for
details. The F-test row reports, for each first stage regression, the F-test of excluded instruments.
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Table A9:
Estimated fixed effects for the Italian universities.
Assist Assoc
Region University Estimate PValue Estimate PValue
Puglia Bari 0.043 0.714 0.187 0.566
Basilicata Basilicata 0.066 0.716 0.231 0.447
Lombardia Bergamo 0.127 0.143 0.237 0.424
Emilia Romagna Bologna 0.063 0.636 0.270 0.415
Lombardia Brescia 0.108 0.207 0.321 0.277
Lombardia Bocconi Milano 0.227 0.035 0.177 0.556
Sardegna Cagliari 0.265 0.000
Marche Camerino 0.098 0.353 0.210 0.482
Lazio Cassino e Lazio Meridionale 0.128 0.145 0.225 0.446
Sicilia Catania 0.220 0.118 0.159 0.608
Calabria Catanzaro 0.095 0.763
Abruzzo ChietiPescara 0.069 0.506 0.261 0.402
Veneto Ca’ Foscari Venezia 0.110 0.335 0.319 0.282
Lombardia Cattolica Del Sacro Cuore 0.066 0.491 0.336 0.280
Lazio Europea Di Roma 0.146 0.091 0.269 0.363
Emilia Romagna Ferrara 0.132 0.209 0.312 0.457
Toscana Firenze 0.253 0.193 0.291 0.333
Puglia Foggia 0.114 0.546 0.243 0.401
Liguria Genova 0.083 0.519 0.325 0.265
Lombardia I.U.S.S. Pavia 0.090 0.335 0.264 0.382
Lombardia Insubria 0.129 0.137 0.304 0.301
Lombardia Iulm Milano 0.022 0.834 0.384 0.283
Abruzzo L’Aquila 0.108 0.224 0.344 0.251
Lombardia Liuc Castellanza 0.109 0.220 0.185 0.541
Lazio Luiss Guido Carli Roma 0.139 0.138 0.236 0.428
Puglia Lum Jean Monnet 0.141 0.169 0.308 0.305
Lazio Luspio 0.067 0.510 0.342 0.254
Lazio Libera Univ. Maria Ss.AssuntaLumsa Roma 0.111 0.203 0.233 0.437
Trentino Alto Adige Libera Univ. Di Bolzano 0.589 0.041 0.293 0.835
Marche Macerata 0.148 0.154 0.288 0.329
Sicilia Messina 0.116 0.242 0.222 0.458
Lombardia Milano 0.090 0.353 0.455 0.177
Lombardia MilanoBicocca 0.137 0.221 0.209 0.479
Emilia Romagna Modena e Reggio Emilia 0.117 0.170 0.325 0.267
Calabria Mediterranea di Reggio Calabria 0.102 0.190 0.230 0.439
Campania Napoli Federico II 0.151 0.081 0.214 0.468
Veneto Padova 0.163 0.081 0.377 0.216
Sicilia Palermo 0.144 0.190 0.172 0.591
Emilia Romagna Parma 0.117 0.186 0.229 0.437
Lombardia Pavia 0.551 0.147
Umbria Perugia 0.121 0.156 0.335 0.255
Piemonte Piemonte Orientale 0.229 0.025 0.280 0.352
Toscana Pisa 0.176 0.069 0.345 0.287
Campania Parthenope Di Napoli 0.111 0.197 0.241 0.415
Marche Politecnica delle Marche 0.094 0.330 0.258 0.382
Puglia Politecnico di Bari 0.101 0.307 0.250 0.389
Lombardia Politecnico di Milano 0.139 0.117 0.439 0.217
Piemonte Politecnico di Torino 0.120 0.175 0.196 0.505
Lazio Roma Foro Italico 0.078 0.440 0.232 0.440
Lazio Roma La Sapienza 0.095 0.590 0.120 0.683
Lazio Roma Tre 0.013 0.919 0.047 0.936
Lazio Roma Tor Vergata 0.145 0.415 0.297 0.359
Lombardia S. Raffaele Milano 0.031 0.834 0.343 0.257
Puglia Salento 0.105 0.275 0.278 0.366
Campania Salerno 0.074 0.454 0.346 0.242
Campania Sannio di Benevento 0.110 0.223 0.273 0.351
Sardegna Sassari 0.094 0.416 1.323 0.196
Piemonte Scienze Gastronomiche Bra 0.036 0.783 0.252 0.398
Toscana Siena 0.070 0.531 0.312 0.293
Friuli Venezia Giulia Sissa Trieste 0.157 0.157 0.212 0.481
Toscana Sum Ist. Italiano di Scienze Umane Firenze 0.050 0.755 0.198 0.533
Toscana Scuola IMT Lucca 0.143 0.262 0.368 0.248
Toscana Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 0.044 0.750 0.555 0.105
Toscana Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna 0.126 0.157 0.188 0.519
Campania Seconda Univ. Napoli 0.076 0.401 0.284 0.347
Calabria Stranieri di Reggio Calabria 0.011 0.926 0.235 0.451
Umbria Stranieri di Perugia 0.662 0.038
Toscana Stranieri di Siena 0.028 0.760 0.256 0.384
Abruzzo Teramo 0.101 0.408 0.301 0.310
Piemonte Torino 0.063 0.466 0.362 0.219
Trentino Alto Adige Trento 0.068 0.581 0.239 0.429
Friuli Venezia Giulia Trieste 0.236 0.042 0.349 0.262
Lazio Tuscia 0.090 0.318 0.278 0.350
Friuli Venezia Giulia Udine 0.099 0.363 0.153 0.620
Sicilia UKE Univ. Kore di Enna 0.143 0.082 0.157 0.589
Lazio Unicusano Telematica Roma 0.175 0.066 0.305 0.292
Marche Urbino Carlo Bo 0.090 0.535 0.104 0.832
Lazio Univ. Campus BioMedico di Roma 0.086 0.328 0.286 0.331
Lombardia Univ. Telematica ECampus 0.172 0.131 0.222 0.451
Campania Univ. Telematica Giustino Fortunato 0.114 0.191 0.272 0.356
Lazio Univ. Telematica Guglielmo Marconi 0.124 0.154 0.285 0.331
Lazio Univ. Telematica Internazionale Uninettuno 0.111 0.243 0.183 0.548
Campania Univ. Telematica Pegaso 0.153 0.101 0.279 0.344
Lazio Univ. Telematica Unitelma Sapienza 0.123 0.157 0.221 0.448
Lazio Univ. Telematica Universitas Mercatorum 0.099 0.312 0.216 0.462
Veneto Univ. Iuav Di Venezia 0.123 0.182 0.337 0.291
Note: Estimated university fixed effects from the regression specified in (9), for the samples of assistant
and associate professors. Details of the regression are in the note of Table 5.
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